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Articles
The Influence of Terrorist Attacks on Human Rights
in the United States: The Aftermath of September 11,
2001.
Professor Emanuel Gross .
Introduction
On September 11, 2001, foreign terrorist forces operating
within the American heartland subjected the United States to a
massive and barbaric attack. How did it happen that the United
States was surprised by this attack? How could the large number
of people who participated in the suicide operation move freely
about in the United States and spend years planning and training
for this operation without the intelligence services finding out?
These questions immediately raised the presumption that the
immigration, intelligence, and security authorities were
insufficiently equipped to deal with a terrorist threat because of
constitutional restrictions, and therefore, constitutional solutions
had to be found that could create a new balance between human
rights and the security needs of the American nation.
This view led to the enactment of the "USA PATRIOT Act,"
("Patriot Act").' The Patriot Act empowered and equipped the
authorities with the legal means to better observe the conduct of
individuals through sophisticated surveillance devices, including
monitoring, tracking, searching a suspect's computer movements,
* All translations from Hebrew sources are provided by and attributable to the
author. Each such translation is indicated in the corresponding notes.
I Professor, member of the Faculty of Law, Haifa University. Thanks are due to
my research assistant Ms. Karin Meridor, whose diligence and dedicated work enabled
this article. Thanks are due to the Hakiria Hacademit, Kiriat Huno, Israel for the
financial support of this research.
2 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 (codified as amendments to various sections of U.S.C.) [hereinafter USA
PATRIOT Act].
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and eavesdropping on communications with other computer
users.
3
The Patriot Act also equipped authorities with special powers
to search and investigate aliens seeking to enter the United States,
special powers to arrest persons suspected of being terrorists, and
special deportation procedures.4 The Patriot Act limits the
principle of judicial supervision almost to the point of elimination
so that security agencies and law enforcement can perform
expanded functions. Such functions are intended to be pursued as
speedily as possible, without being delayed by court proceedings,
which the Act implies offer nothing but unnecessary impediments.
This is why, immediately upon the enactment of the
legislation, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) felt it
necessary to explain to the country that:
At first glance. .. the Act signed into law by President Bush
appears to only mean to give law enforcement officials the
necessary tools to find terrorists and prevent future attacks. But
in reality, the USA Patriot Act continues an alarming trend
known as court-stripping -- removing authority from the
judiciary -- in time of crisis.... As it has done in times of past
tragedy, the government responded by passing legislation that
reduces or eliminates the process of judicial review and erodes
our civil liberties. 5
There is no doubt that the attack of September 11, 2001 caught
the United States by complete surprise, similar to the surprise
produced by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Did the
immediate reaction of the .United States limiting or potentially
violating human rights meet the tests laid down by the
Constitution? Were they sufficiently proportional? Is there not a
danger that the authorities have been given an overly broad permit
to scrutinize the lives of citizens under the pretext of security
needs? Is there not a danger that this will lead to powers that are
even more excessive? Today, the Patriot Act deals with persons
suspected of terrorism; tomorrow the persons targeted might be
3 Id. at §§ 201-202.
4 Id. at §§ 401-418.
5 Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, at http://www.aclu.org/
features/fllOlOlb.html (Nov. 11, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation).
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political opponents!
It is difficult to find a consensus in the United States
supporting the legislation of the Patriot Act, notwithstanding its
description as the "USA PATRIOT Act." While the war being
waged by the United States against terror has created unity, the
legislative measures provided by the Patriot Act and the
concomitant dangers they pose to democracy - the symbol of the
United States - have impaired this unity and have led to fear and
anxiety being voiced.6 Critics understand that creating a balance
between national security, democracy, and human rights is a
difficult task, but the speed with which the reassessment of this
balance was performed is extremely worrying. Congress took
action without a proper debate on the Patriot Act's ramifications
and without providing the American public with an opportunity to
voice its opinion, despite the enormous impact of the Patriot Act
on the daily lives of all American citizens. The balance drawn is
faulty because overwhelming weight has been given to security
needs, leaving human rights far behind:
Our nation is rightfully in both shock and mourning from the
events of September 1 1th, but the principles of rigorous debate
and thoughtful legislative process should not be forsaken in this
time of crisis. When fundamental individual liberties are at
stake, our process of public discourse is all the more important.
After all, that is what democracy is all about.
7
The United States's reaction has a dual dimension. First, it has
increased internal oversight procedures by creating a new balance
between human rights and security needs. Secondly, it seeks to
combat terrorism abroad by armed means and other devices.
This article examines both the internal and the external
dimensions of the United States's response in its war against
terror. The internal dimension of the article will examine the
violations of human rights justified on grounds of national security
in light of recent American legislation. In this context, it shall
compare the American position to the experiences of other
6 See id. See also, e.g., Ronald Weich, American Civil Liberties Union, Upsetting
Checks and Balances: Congressional Hostility to the Courts in Times of Crisis (2001),
(describing various concerns for the erosion of civil liberties) available at
http://www.aclu.org/safeandfree/index.html (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation).
7 DAILY RECORD, Nov. 19, 2001, at lB.
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democracies such as Israel and Britain, which have also been
struggling against terrorism. The external dimension of the article
shall consider whether the United States's operation in
Afghanistan can be considered an act of self-defense or whether it
is a punitive operation.
Part One will examine the new legislation adopted by the
United States in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. Part
Two will analyze the scope of the protection given to human rights
in the United States prior to the enactment of the Patriot Act. Part
Three will present the stringent protection given in the past to
human rights prior to the uncovering of the brutal phenomenon of
international terrorism. Part Four will examine the constitutional
measures available in similar cases in Britain and Israel. The
question of whether the United States's response in the internal
sphere is appropriate to achieve the goal of national security is
discussed in Part Five. The external dimension and the question of
whether the Afghan operation is indeed an act of self-defense, as a
matter of international law, are discussed in Part Six. Part Six also
draws a comparison with Israel's response to Palestinian terrorism.
Finally, Part Seven sums up the debate and looks to the future.
I. The New Legislation in the United States
As the Bush administration's urgent quest for new anti-terrorism
laws bogged down in the last days of September, lawmakers
from both parties expressed concern that the hastily prepared
package could greatly expand police powers at the expense of
privacy and other civil liberties.8
During the course of October 2001, the United States enacted
the "USA PATRIOT Act,"9 which was designed to provide
security and law enforcement agencies with tools to fight
terrorism. This Part will describe the main provisions of the law
aimed at easing the investigative authorities' task of locating and
capturing terrorists, along with the repercussions these measures
will have for human rights in the United States.
8 UMPanel Eyes Our Loss of Liberties, 27 THE MoNT. LAWYER No. 2, Oct. 2001,
at 23.
9 USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 2 (subtitled as "An Act [t]o deter and punish
terrorist acts in the United States and around the world, to enhance law enforcement
investigatory tools, and for other purposes.").
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First, it should be pointed out that the Patriot Act creates a new
definition for the term "domestic terrorism"" that casts doubt on
the existence of any distinction whatsoever between an ordinary
criminal offense and an act of terrorism." Thus, all the additional
powers granted by the Patriot Act to security and law enforcement
agencies may be implemented in investigations unrelated to
terrorism. Consequently, there is a fear of overreaching. The
definition may also embrace people who are involved in political
protests and will accordingly be subject to violations of their
constitutional rights, notwithstanding that their acts are not of the
terrorist nature upon which the Patriot Act has set its sights. 2
Second, as we shall see below, the Patriot Act significantly
alters the court system's supervision of the executive in its
investigation of routine criminal matters unconnected to
terrorism.13 We shall now turn to an examination of the principal
constitutional rights that have been impaired by the Patriot Act:
freedom of association, the right to privacy, and the right to due
process.
A. The violation offreedom of association
The First Amendment provides:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof: or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press: or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances. 14
The inevitable consequence of broadening the definition of
terrorist activity in the Patriot Act is to impair freedom of
association and freedom of expression. The Patriot Act defines
domestic terrorism as an act which:
(A) involve[s] acts dangerous to human life that are a violation
of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State; (B)
10 Id. at § 802 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2331).
11 Id. at § 201. Because of the overly broad definition in section 802 of what can
constitute terrorist activity, expanded search powers in section 201 could be employed
against individuals and organizations expressing political dissent unrelated to terrorism.
12 Id.
13 The New Normalcy, 166 N.J.L.J. 354 (2001).
14 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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appear[s] to be intended-(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by
intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a
government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping;
and (C) occur[s] primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States.
15
Such a broad and vague definition threatens to transform
conduct that, in the past, was thought to reflect a person's freedom
of expression or freedom of association designed to influence
government policy into a terrorist act. An essential condition of a
democratic regime is that it enables legitimate political opposition
to the regime.' 6 Section 802 of the Patriot Act fails to meet this
condition.
The Patriot Act further erodes freedom of association in
section 806, which deals with the assets of a terrorist
organization. 7 Notwithstanding the provisions of the First
Amendment that confer upon an individual a right to support all
legal activities or to assemble in a group of the individual's
choosing, the Patriot Act enables the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) to investigate any person having connections
with a terrorist organization without first proving that that person
knowingly supports terrorist activities or that he was reasonably
aware that the group supports terrorism.
18
The prohibition against supporting a group is a violation of
freedom of association, since without that support, freedom of
association cannot be realized: the right to associate is not
effective without the right to financially support one's chosen
group. 19
. The combination of these provisions seriously impairs freedom
of association because what determines support for a terrorist
organization depends on the definition of a terrorist organization.
15 USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 2, at §802.
16 lain Cameron, Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police. Second Report: "Freedom and Security Under the Law ", 48
MOD. L. REv. 201, 204 (1985).
17 USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 2, at § 806 (amending 18 U.S.C. 981(a)(1)).
18 See supra note 10.
19 David Cole, Hanging With the Wrong Crowd: Of Gangs, Terrorists, and the
Right of Association, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 203, 248 (1999).
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We have seen that the Patriot Act provides a very broad
definition. 20 As a result, many organizations may find themselves
defined as terrorist organizations, and many people supporting
them may find themselves in breach of the law.
B. The violation of the right to privacy
The Fourth Amendment provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, " and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.21
Comments made prior to the passage of the Patriot Act are
now even more apt. The Patriot Act, "[g]rants the FBI access to a
wide range of personal, educational, medical and financial records
without requiring evidence of a crime and without judicial review
based on a very low standard that does not require probable cause
of a crime or even relevancy to an ongoing terrorism
investigation.",
22
Thus, for example, section 213 fulfills an aspiration long
suspected of enforcement agencies-to carry out a search without
having to first notify the person whose property is being
searched.2 3 In other words, agents may enter a house or office
armed with a search warrant while the occupant is away, carry out
a search of the property, take photographs, explore his electronic
communication equipment, and only notify the occupant that a
search had taken place at a later date. It should be noted that the
court will only allow notification of the search to be delayed if:
"the court finds reasonable cause to believe that providing
immediate notification of the execution of the warrant may have
an adverse result., 24
An additional tool of questionable constitutionality provided to
law enforcement agencies by the Patriot Act is the relaxation of
20 See supra note 10.
21 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
22 Supra note 10, at § 802.
23 See USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 2, at § 213 (amending'18 U.S.C. § 3103(a)).
24 Id. at § 213(b)(1).
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the Fourth Amendment requirement to describe a particular place
to be searched. 25  A judge can now issue a warrant to search
property and targets that may move outside the local jurisdiction
before the warrant can be executed.26
There is no doubt that the process described above, searching
without notification, profoundly erodes the provisions of the
Constitution intended to protect the citizen against unreasonable
searches.27 The absence of significant restrictions on the general
search process could give authorities great discretion, not
subjected to scrutiny by a judicial officer, regarding what, when,
and where to search. The individual, unaware of the invasion,
would be unable to protest against the search. This result
significantly undermines core protections against unreasonable
search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
The violation of the right to privacy continues in numerous
provisions of the Act. Sections 201 through 202 authorize the use
of surveillance, wire tapping, and eavesdropping measures with
respect to operations allegedly connected to terrorism. 28 Section
203 enables the disclosure of sensitive information relating to
American citizens and wire tapping by secret service agents
without any judicial supervision justifying such disclosures.29
Pursuant to warrants, section 209 enables the seizure of data
messages stored in electronic communication devices, including
unread email, as well as the interception of stored data such as
voice messages.3"
Sections 210 and 211 enable law enforcement agencies to
subpoena records for the purpose of investigation without judicial
scrutiny.3' Law enforcement agencies may subpoena a great deal
of information from computer servers and Internet providers
25 See id. at § 219 (amending FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(a)).
26 Id.
27 See e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (requiring judicial
review for the lawfulness and reasonableness of searches by law enforcement).
28 USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 2, at § 201 (amending 18 U.S.C. 2516); § 202
(amending 18 U.S.C. 2516).
29 Id. at § 203(a)(1) (amending FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C), giving authority to
share criminal investigative information).
30 Id. at § 209 (amending 18 U.S.C. 2510).
31 Id. at § 210 (amending 18 U.S.C. 2703(c)(2)); § 211 (amending 47 U.S.C. 551).
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regarding session times and duration, the address of the subscriber,
means and source of payment, and details of the subscriber.
Section 212 enables the Internet provider to divulge electronic
communications without a warrant and without being asked in
cases of immediate danger of death or serious physical injury.32 In
such cases, the provider has a defense against a subscriber's claim
for breach of the duty of secrecy between the provider and
subscriber.33
Section 217 enables the interception of computer information
obtained by trespass without requiring a court warrant.34
Sections 214 and 216 deal with surveillance orders that are
intended to trace incoming or outgoing calls.35 The court must
grant such an order if the search may provide information relevant
to a crime.36 The court has technical discretion over the manner of
submitting the application, but it has no substantive discretion over
the standard of certainty needed to prove that such a warrant will
indeed lead to information of the alleged crime.37 In other words,
the court is not required to maintain the more stringent standard
demanded in the past. Section 214 extends the class of cases in
which an order may be sought to protect against international
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.38 Section 216
authorizes the installation and use of tracing devices in new forms
of electronic communications in addition to the historic
application to telephone lines.39
An additional invasion of privacy may be found in the
statutory provisions that enable the agencies to investigate bank
accounts in order to fight international money laundering. 4° Banks
32 Id. at § 212 (amending 18 U.S.C. § § 2702, 2703).
33 See generally Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 1055, (C.D.
Cal. 2002); In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litigation, 2002 U.S. Dist. WL 1880387 (D.
Mass. Aug. 13, 2002).
34 USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 2, at § 217 (amending 18 U.S.C. 2510).
35 id. at § 214 (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1842 (Foreign Intelligence Service Act of
1978)); § 216 (amending 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3124, 3127).
36 Id.
37 See id.
38 Id.
39 Id. at § 216.
40 Id. at § § 301-330.
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are now also required to report suspect banking transactions.4
Section 358 authorizes the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
other law enforcement agencies to obtain sensitive and personal
information without judicial supervision.4 2
One accepted view holds that the investigation of bank
accounts and the surveillance of transactions, in themselves, are
not efficient tools in the fight against terrorism:
Part of the problem is that money-laundering laws force banks to
spy on everybody, and this generates more than 10 million
reports every year. This means that law enforcement is forced to
look for a needle in a haystack .... Lawmakers just voted to
make the haystack bigger by approving a measure with more
stringent requirements on American banks. ... Rushing to enact
laws that have tough-sounding titles but provide no additional
tools to combat terrorism is a mistake.43
The principal difficulty in these provisions is the absence of
judicial scrutiny: "[u]nder many of these provisions the judge
exercises no review function whatsoever. The court must issue an
order granting access to sensitive information upon mere
certification by a government official. The Patriot Act reflects a
distrust of the judiciary as an independent safeguard against abuse
of executive authority. 4
4
Additionally, the Patriot Act impairs the right to due process of
law. The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to
41 Id. at § 351 (amending 31 U.S.C. 5318); § 359 (amending 31 U.S.C. 5312, 5318,
5330).
42 Id. at § 358.
43 Veronique de Rugy, Privacy Punished, Not Terrorism, at http://www.cato.org/
dailys/10-26-01.html (Oct. 26, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation).
44 Ronald Weich, Upsetting Checks and Balances - Congressional Hostility
Toward the Courts in Times of Crisis, 3 (Oct. 2001), at http://www.aclu.org/congress/
courtstripping.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation).
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be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, nor shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
45compensation.
However, where suspect aliens are found in the territory of the
United States, section 41246 of the Patriot Act authorizes their
detention for a period of seven days with the certification of the
Attorney General. This period of detention may be extended for
additional periods of up to six months if the release of the alien
will threaten the national security of the United States, the safety
of the community, or of any person.47 The Attorney General must
review the certification every six months, and on the basis of his
sole discretion, a person may be held indefinitely without access to
judicial review.48
The right to judicial process is impaired in two ways: (1)
detention without judicial review and (2) the Attorney General
may detain the alien without "probable cause' if: "[h]e has
reasonable grounds to believe that the non-citizen is engaged in
any activity that endangers the national security of the United
States." '49 The Patriot Act confers upon the Attorney General a
vast power to impair the most fundamental right of a person: his
freedom.,
The fact that the right to. appeal a conviction, the right to
habeus corpus, is restricted is a gross infringement of due process
to which the suspect is entitled prior to being deprived of his
liberty. "The final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. There shall be no right of appeal in such proceedings to
any other circuit court of appeals."5
In the view of the Attorney General, these provisions "are vital
to preventing, disrupting or delaying new attacks. It is difficult for
45 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is also
concerned with the right to due process. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
46 USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 2, at § 412.
47 Id. at § 412(a)(6).
48 Id. at § 412(a)(7).
49 See supra note 46, at § 412.
50 Id. at § 412(b)(3).
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a person in jail or under detention to murder innocent people or to
aid or abet in terrorism.,
51
C. Infringement of the right to properly defend oneself and be
represented by an attorney
The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution provides that "the
accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defense. 52
The Fourth Amendment states that every citizen shall be
protected against "unreasonable searches and seizures., 53  On
October 31, 2001, the Attorney General decided to allow the
monitoring of communications between the accused and his
attorney in cases where it was feared that the accused might try to
pass information through his attorney to persons on the outside;
information which might endanger national security or which
might lead to violence and terrorism. 4 The order violating the
privilege between an attorney and his client has been justified in
case law. According to case law, there is no privilege or
protection for communications between attorneys and clients that
might lead to the commission of illegal acts.5
In the opinion of the Attorney General, the monitoring of
communications does not violate the Sixth Amendment to the
Constitution because a balance exists between the right of the
accused to the fair advice of counsel and the government's interest
in foiling future terrorist activities and violence. 6 The attorney
and his client must be informed prior to the monitoring, and the
monitoring must be conducted by professional teams. 7 The
information obtained may not be revealed without the
51 Richard L Berke et al., Bush's New Rules to Fight Terror Transform the Legal
Landscape, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2001, at Al (quoting Attorney Gen. John Ashcroft).
52 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
53 Id. at amend. IV.
54 Bureau of Prisons Regulation, 66 Fed. Reg. 211, 55061 (Oct. 31, 2001).
55 United States v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d 972, 975 (5th Cir. 1975). "It is
beyond dispute that the attorney-client privilege does not extend to communications
regarding an intended crime." Id.
56 Bureau of Prisons Regulation, 66 Fed. Reg. 211, 55061, 211, 55064 (Oct. 31,
2001).
57 Id.
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authorization of a federal court:
[T]he procedures established in this new rule are designed to
ensure that defendants' Sixth Amendment rights are
scrupulously protected. The circumstances in which monitoring
will be permitted are defined narrowly and in a way that reflects
a very important law enforcement interest: the prevention of acts
of violence or terrorism. The monitoring is not surreptitious; on
the contrary, the defendant and his or her attorney are required
to be given notice of the government's listening activities. The
rule requires that privileged information not be retained by the
government monitors and that, apart from disclosures necessary
to thwart an imminent act of violence or terrorism, any
disclosures to investigators or prosecutors must be approved by
a federal judge.58
Notifying an attorney prior to his meeting with his or her client
that his discussions will be monitored will undoubtedly prevent
the transfer of any information between the suspect and the
attorney. One cannot ignore the violation of the rights of the
accused ensuing from the Attorney General's discretionary
decision allowing the monitoring of attorneys with their clients.
The Attorney General will authorize such monitoring if there is
probable cause to believe that the detainee will use the connection
with his attorney to facilitate the commission of further terrorist
acts.
While the release of monitored information requires court
authorization, the initial monitoring order does not require such
authorization. " Authorization is not mandated because a court
would likely not authorize monitoring merely on the basis of
"reasonable suspicion" without proof of "probable cause."6 °
This decision is intended as a new device that will aid the fight
against terrorism. Prior to the enactment of the Patriot Act, a
similar decision was in effect.61 Today, the Patriot Act, which
confers broad ranging powers upon the Attorney General, provides
that official with even more extensive, unconstrained power. The
58 Id.
59 William Glaberson, Experts Divided on New Anti-Terror Policy that Scuttles
Lawyer-Client Confidentiality, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.13, 2001, at B7.
60 Id.
61 See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
2002]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Attorney General may exploit this power in order to extend the
period of time in which monitoring may be performed from a
period of 120 days to a period of one year.62
One may ask why constitutional defenses must be sacrificed at
a time when the existing legal system has already put in place
security measures to deal with attorneys who collaborate with
terrorist suspects including obtaining a warrant authorizing
monitoring. There is a strong sense that "Attorney General John
Ashcroft is essentially trying to bypass an already-available option
of getting a court order to do wiretaps or searches, even of lawyers
when evidence warrants."63
D. The establishment of military tribunals to try foreign
terrorists
The Patriot Act itself does not contain provisions regarding
special proceedings for aliens.64 Supplementary provisions in this
regard are provided in a special Presidential Order: "Military
Order: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in
the War Against Terrorism."65
A trial before a military tribunal is a trial without a jury.66 The
Presidential Order explains that the procedure will not be
conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence and rules of
criminal procedure followed in the federal courts.6 7 In other words,
the military tribunals lack the protection afforded in the federal
courts.
The terrorist attack against the United States on September 11,
2001 threatened the freedoms of the nation in a concrete manner.
62 Bureau of Prisons Regulation, 66 Fed. Reg. 211, 55061, 211, 55063 (Oct. 31,
2001).
63 Kevin Murphy, Civil Rights Advocates Promise to Fight Ashcroft on
Eavesdropping Order, KNIGHT-RIDDER/TRIBUNE NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 9, 2001.
64 However, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act provided special
trial procedures for aliens. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No.104-132, 110 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1248 (1996).
65 Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial
of Certain Non-Citizens in. the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. R. 57833 (Nov.
16,2001).
66 Id. at § l(f.
67 Id.
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The United States must be careful to ensure that its anti-terrorist
legislation will not threaten these freedoms even more. The fear
that human rights will be unjustifiably and unnecessarily violated
is strengthened by the fact that the legislation is not directed solely
at terrorist acts in their narrow sense, but rather at all acts of
violence.68 The United States has again proved, as it did in 1996,
that in times of emergency and crisis, democracy does not succeed
in preserving its values, and human rights are violated in the name
of safeguarding national security.,
We shall now turn to the 1996 Act which, like the Patriot Act,
was the outcome of the claim that law enforcement agencies had
insufficient means available to them to fight terrorism and that the
courts were hindering the protection of American citizens.
II. Anti-Terrorist Legislation Prior to the Patriot Act
A. The United States Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996.(AEDPA)69
On its face, the Patriot Act may Seem almost identical to the
AEDPA of 1996. Both were enacted as a result of terrorist attacks
against the United States. The distinction between them does not
lie in the quality of their respective provisions but in the degree to
which they impair human rights. The terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001 in New York and Washington took many
more lives than the 1995 terrorist attack on Oklahoma City. The
Patriot Act is more far reaching than the AEDPA in terms of the
powers granted to the enforcement, security and intelligence
agencies, and the extent to which they violate human rights:
The 1996 anti-terrorism bill is a direct antecedent of the recent
USA-Patriot Act. In response to the 1995 bombing of the
federal office building in Oklahoma City, President Clinton,
much as President Bush did after the September 11 attacks,
called on Congress to grant him new tools to conduct
surveillance and detain suspicious individuals. Unlike the USA-
Patriot Act, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 was the product of a full year of congressional
deliberation before it was enacted. But like this year's anti-
68 USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 2, at §802.
69 See supra note 64.
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terrorism bill, the 1996 bill granted the government new powers
while insulating certain enforcement actions - notably death
sentences - from meaningful oversight by federal judges.70
Even before 1996, there were laws in effect that were intended
to fight terrorism that endangered human rights. The Anti
Terrorism Act of 1987 (ATA)71 was enacted following attacks by
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) against American
citizens. The Act primarily infringed upon the rights protected by
the First Amendment to the Constitution - the right to freedom of
expression and freedom of association: "[t]he ATA made it
unlawful for anyone whose purpose [it was] to further the interests
of the PLO to receive anything of value except information from
the PLO, expend funds from the PLO, or establish an office at the
behest of the PLO. ' 2
In the case of Mendelsohn v. Meese, the petitioner argued that
the ATA was unconstitutional because it infringed upon First
Amendment rights. The Court held that the ATA could stop the
operations of the PLO in the United States. However, the court
narrowed the application of the ATA by further holding that it did
not prohibit the establishment of a PLO informational office as
long as the organization did not supply any money to, or assume
control of, the office within the United States. 73 However, the
legislation up to 1996 was, in the opinion of President Clinton: "a
confusing patchwork of measures."74 The AEDPA, like the Patriot
Act, would supply: "new power for the FBI to check credit, hotel
and travel records of suspected terrorists, broader federal wiretap
authority, 1000 new law enforcement employees to monitor
terrorist threats, and a requirement that explosives be 'tagged' to
make them easier to trace.,
75
70 Ronald Weich, Response to the Enactment of the Patriot Act, at
http://www.aclu.org/news/2001/n110101d.html (Nov. 1, 2001) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
71 Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, 22 U.S.C. 5201, 5201-5203 (1988).
72 Ned Greenberg, Mendelsohn v. Meese: A First Amendment Challenge to the
Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, 39 AM. U.L. REV. 355, 355 (1990).
73 Mendelsohn v. Meese, 695 F.Supp.1474, 1490 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
74 Key Provisions of Counterterrorism Act, GANNETr NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 20,
1995.
75 David Wise, Terrorism: With Rail Travel, Must Freedom be Curbed?, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 15, 1995, at MI.
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B. Constitutional Rights Infringed Upon By the AEDPA76
1. Infringement of the right to privacy.77 '
A number of provisions of the AEDPA extend the
authorization given to investigative and law enforcement agencies
to conduct wiretapping and tapping of other electronic means of
communication, infiltration of bank accounts, and monitoring of
credit card transactions in order to keep track of travel and hotels
used by the suspects. All these measures require a court warrant.
For example, a government agent may require providers of
telephones and other means of communication to preserve
evidence and information about customers who are suspected of
offenses against the AEDPA for a period of ninety days until a
court order is issued.78
2. Infringement offreedom of expression.79
The AEDPA enables the President to act against individuals
who express support for the political views of an organization
included in the list of terrorist organizations.
3. Infringement offreedom of association. 80
The AEDPA prohibits participation in an organization that
assists or supports terrorism, without referring to the purpose of
the individual who participates in the activities. The purpose may
be to support legal activities undertaken by the organization. The
Act does not define the term "participation," and its provisions are
broadly framed and vague:
[T]his bill targets mere knowing participation in a "paramilitary
organization" - regardless of whether the person participated
only in the organization's legal activities. . . . [The bill] is
unconstitutionally over broad and vague. The bill defines
"paramilitary organization" in a circular sense by referring to
"paramilitary structure" without ever defining "paramilitary.
. The bill does not define the broad phrase "to oppose the
authority of the United States or of any State.... ." The bill does
76 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.104-132,
110 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1248 (1996).
77 Id. at § 731.
78 Id. at § 804.
79 See id. at § 300.
80 Id. at § 301-303.
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not define "participation."81
Before the provisions restricting freedom of association were
due to enter into effect, the Secretary of State was supposed to
prepare a list of organizations deemed to be terrorist organizations.
Indeed, on October 2, 1997, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
presented a list of thirty such organizations. 2  The AEDPA
prohibited any association with the terrorist organizations,
including humanitarian support" such as providing food, shelter,
and education. 4 Though humanitarian relief was denied on the
grounds that any contribution to an organization so committed to
terrorist activities would serve only to strengthen it, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals has held that: "targeting individuals
because of activities such as fundraising is impermissible unless
the government can show that the group members had the specific
intent to pursue illegal group goals." 5
4. Infringement of due process.
The AEDPA has severely infringed the rights of immigrants.
Beyond the criminal sanctions to which every citizen is subject,
foreigners legally residing in the United States, who are suspected
of supporting a terrorist organization, may find themselves
undergoing an expedited deportation process as may immigrants
who are involved in criminal activities.86 The deportation process
is conducted by special courts set up by the AEDPA. These courts
simplify the deportation process by authorizing the production of
81 Nature and Threat of Violent Anti-Government Groups in America: Hearing
Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 1st Sess. 164, 166 (Nov. 2, 1995)
(prepared statement of Gregory T. Nojeim, Legislative Counsel, American Civil
Liberties Union).
82 Abu Sayyaf, Terrorist Organizations, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse), Nov. 26,
1997, at B6; Press Release, United States Information Agency, Designation of Foreign
Terrorist Organizations, M2 (Oct. 9, 1997).
83 Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1204-05 (C.D. Cal.
1998).
84 Controversy Dogs People's Mojahedin, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1998, § A at
A 15, available at http://www.washtimes.com.
85 American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee v. Reno, 119 F. 3d 1367, 1376
(1997).
86 Roberta Smith, America Tries to Come to Terms with Terrorism: The United
States Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 v. British Anti-Terrorism
Law and International Response, 5 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 249, 268-269 (1997).
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privileged evidence87 and evidence obtained unlawfully by the
government.88
The special process is initiated on the basis of an application
submitted by the Attorney General on the grounds that "ordinary"
process might endanger national security. The judge in the special
court examines the application ex parte and in camera, and orders
a special hearing if: "there is probable cause to believe that the
alien . . . is an alien terrorist. . . present in the United States; and
removal under Title II would pose a risk to the national security of
the United States. 89
There is no doubt that this is a severe violation of the right to
due process, which may lead to unjustified and faulty decision-
making. These provisions of the AEDPA are in complete
opposition to the case law prior to the Act which states that:
"aliens within the United States enjoy the protection of the First
Amendment." 9
5. Infringement of the right to habeas corpus.9'
Violations arise because the AEDPA limits the amount of
time in which the right to habeas corpus may be implemented to
one year.92 When adeath sentence has been issued, this period is
reduced to six months.93 The grounds on which a prisoner may
appeal a court decision preventing him from implementing his
right to habeas corpus have also been limited.94
It is possible to classify the violations caused by the anti-
terrorist legislation prior to 2001 into four groups: (1) violations of
freedom of expression; (2) violations of freedom of association;
87 See 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(1)(A) (2000).
88 See id. at § 1534(e)(1)(B) ("An alien subject to removal under this subchapter
shall not be entitled to suppress evidence that the alien alleges was unlawfully obtained..
89 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act § 503(c)(2)(A)(B).
90 Rafeedie v. I.N.S., 795 F. Supp. 13, 22 (D.D.C. 1992) (holding the government's
attempt to use secret evidence to exclude the alien unconstitutional).
91 Habeas corpus is a writ used by prisoners to "test the legality of the detention or
imprisonment" and is "guaranteed by U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9, and by state constitutions."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 709-710 (6th ed. 1990).
92 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act § 101(d)(1).
93 Id. at § 2263(a).
94 Id. at § § 102-103 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (2002) and FED. R. App. P. 22).
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(3) violations of due process; and (4) violations of the right to
privacy. All of these violations may affect innocent citizens:95
This law substitutes "guilt by association" for actual evidence of
criminal wrongdoing. It allows government to monitor and
prosecute expressive and associational activities that are at the
heart of the First Amendment. It allows citizens to be
imprisoned, and non-citizens to be summarily deported, because
of their support for the lawful, humanitarian activities of any
group that the Secretary of State might label as 'terrorist'- even
if they did not know of the group's allegedly terrorist activities,
let alone support them. Moreover, non-citizens, including long-
term legal residents, can be deported in kangaroo-court-like
proceedings. These proceedings are closed to the accused non-
citizens and their lawyers, and are based on secret evidence that
they cannot see or respond to. In short, the new anti terrorism
legislation does not make us more safe but only less free.96
At the same time, then-President William Clinton was
explaining the AEDPA legislation in the following way: "[s]o let
us honor those who lost their lives by resolving to hold fast against
the forces of violence and division, by never allowing them to
shake our resolve or break our spirit, to frighten us into sacrificing
our sacred freedoms or surrendering a drop of precious American
liberty."97 A large number of the statutory provisions designed to
suppress terrorist activities caused injury and undermined the
"sacred freedoms" that America so wished to protect from terrorist
threats.
Following the terrorist attack on Oklahoma City, intense rage
was felt in American society, which demanded legislation of this
kind. After the storm passed and calm was restored, Americans
began to understand the draconian repercussions for constitutional
rights presented by such legislation: "[w]hile many Americans
want to live in a safe environment without having to worry about
the threat of terrorism, they also want to maintain their basic
constitutional freedoms. Balancing these concerns will not be an
95 Nadine Strossen, Criticisms of Federal Counter-Terrorism Laws, 20 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 531, 538-39 (1997).
96 Id. at 539 (emphasis added).
97 William J. Clinton, Remarks on Signing the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, Address on the South Lawn of the White House (Apr. 24, 1996), in
32 WKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 717, 718 (Apr. 29, 1996).
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easy task."98
Apparently, the United States failed to balance these concerns
in 2001. Once again, the anger of the majority of Americans took
control over the contents of the legislation: "[t]he worst part of the
USA Patriot Act is that its provisions are unlikely to draw the ire
of the average American. As in past times of crisis, the minority is
the most likely target of government excess. It is this reality that
makes the bill's court-stripping provisions so potentially
harmful." 99
This article shall now turn to an examination of the scope of
human rights violations produced by the anti-terrorist legislation
of 1996 and 2001 and compare them with the protection afforded
to these rights prior to that legislation.
IL. The Basic Position of Human Rights in the United States
and the Scope of the Protection Afforded to Them Prior to
the Anti-Terrorist Legislation
As noted, the scope of the protection given to human rights in
the United States is eroded by the Patriot Act. Most of its
provisions are similar in nature to the provisions of the AEDPA.
The two Acts must be examined as one unit, the elements of which
complement each other. The Patriot Act intensifies the harm
caused by the AEDPA to human rights and in two areas even
creates new classes of violations: one regarding the extent of the
protection given to the right to privacy and the other regarding the
extent of the protection given to liberty.
In the following pages, this paper shall examine the scope of
the protection afforded to human rights in the United States prior
to the 1996 shift that occurred by virtue of the AEDPA and
continued five years later by the Patriot Act. This article shall also
consider the points at which the Patriot Act is more severe in its
treatment of those rights than the AEDPA.
98 Roberta Smith, America Tries to Come to Terms With Terrorism: the United
States Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 v. British Anti-Terrorism
Law andInternational Response, 5 CARDOZO J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 249, 278 (1997).
99 Laura W. Murphy, Press Release, ACLU, New Anti-Terrorism Law Once Again
Undermines Role of Judiciary (Nov. 1, 2001), at www.aclu.org/
news/2001/n 110101 c.html (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law
and Commercial Regulation).
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A. The Right to Association
We have seen how the AEDPA and the Patriot Act violate
rights protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution: the
right of association and the right of freedom of expression.
The scope of the protection given to these rights was extremely
broad, and any violation was treated suspiciously by the courts.
As these rights were at the core of political rights, restricting them
was regarded as inconceivable:
[T]he [Supreme] Court has consistently disapproved
governmental action imposing criminal sanctions or denying
rights and privileges solely because of a citizen's association
with an unpopular organization. In these cases it has been
established that guilt by association alone, without [establishing]
that an individual's association poses the threat feared by the
Government, is an impermissible basis upon which to deny First
Amendment rights. The government has the burden of
establishing a knowing affiliation with an organization
possessing unlawful aims and goals, and a specific intent to
further illegal aims.' 00
B. The Right to Freedom of Expression
The standard applied in the United States in relation to the
violation of the freedom of expression is the test of clear and
imminent danger, 1' which allows the suppression of speech only
when it poses a grave, clearly identifiable, and imminent danger to
society.' '2 The test allows the government to criminalize speech
once it is clear that the speech threatens imminent harm to the
nation. 103
Notwithstanding the broad scope of judicial protection given to
this right, the courts have admitted that the right is not absolute.
There may be circumstances in which the restriction on the
freedom of expression will be justified in the name of national
interest and security:
100 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 185-86 (1972).
101 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 378-79 (1927).
102 Tom Hentoft, Speech, Harm, and Self-Government: Understanding the Ambit of
Clear and Present Danger Test, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1455 (1991) (stating that the
test requires harmful consequences of speech to be "imminent" and "grave").
103 See id.
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The First Amendment generally prevents government from
proscribing speech, or even expressive conduct, because of
disapproval of the ideas expressed. . . . From 1791 to the
present, however, our society, like other free but civilized
societies, has permitted restrictions upon the content of speech
in a few limited areas, which are of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality. 10
4
"Thus, a physical assault is not by any stretch of the
imagination expressive conduct protected by the First
Amendment. . . . The First Amendment does not protect
violence."'0 5  The Supreme Court has also held that "the
constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not
permit a state to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of illegal
force except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action."10
6
Nonetheless, only in very limited cases was it possible to
restrict freedom of expression. It certainly was not possible to
impose a general restriction to the effect that any support for the
political views of a terrorist organization was a criminal offense as
follows from the Patriot Act and the AEDPA. In order to achieve
such a result it was necessary to meet a number of requirements:
[I]t is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.' 07
It is, of course, possible to argue that because of the changed
circumstances and the spread of terrorism, the test of clear and
imminent danger is no longer appropriate. The First Amendment
of the Constitution must arguably be interpreted afresh in such a
104 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992).
1o5 Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993).
106 Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
107 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 663 (1994) (quoting U.S. v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
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way as to permit the violation of protected rights even when the
danger is not imminent and cannot be clearly identified. The
rationale is that the interest in national security is an important
interest worthy of protection, and restricting speech that supports
terrorist organizations is a measure which is compatible with this
objective. In such a case, the benefit derived from the restriction
outweighs the damage it causes. However, is the anti-terrorist
legislation excessively restrictive bearing in mind the scope of the
protection given to the right to freedom of expression prior to
1996? This article shall attempt to answer this question below.
C. The Right to Habeas Corpus
Earlier, we saw the statutory restrictions on habeas corpus in
terms of the time period provided for exercising that right. Prior to
that legislation, such restrictions were not allowed: "[h]abeas
corpus provides a remedy.., without limit of time."'0 8
The sole restriction on a prisoner's right to appeal against a
court decision to deprive him of his right to habeus corpus was
that he had to show "probable cause [which] requires [the]
petitioner to make a substantial showing of the denial of [a]
federal right."'0 9
Today, as noted, the circumstances in which it is possible to
restrict habeas corpus are extremely broad, and the right of appeal
has been dramatically circumscribed.
D. Violation of the Rights of the Accused including the Right
to Due Process
We have seen the injury caused by legislation that allows a
person to be convicted by a special process on the basis of
irrefutable secret evidence:
To lock up any human being based on secret evidence is to deny
him the most basic component of due-process-a meaningful
opportunity to defend oneself. It is simply impossible to defend
against secret evidence: How do you prove that you are not a
member of a terrorist organization, where there is no evidence to
108 United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469, 475 (1946).
109 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983) (quoting Stewart v. Beto, 454 F.2d
268, 270 (5th Cir. 1971) (quoting Harris v. Ellis, 204 F.2d 685, 686 (5th Cir. 1953)).
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refute and the organization hasn't even been named?" 0
The judicial process created by the AEDPA, the Patriot Act,
and the Presidential Order issued in the aftermath of the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001 authorizing the trial of aliens in
military tribunals using secret evidence, are all contrary to the
unequivocal rulings of the Supreme Court that in a criminal
proceeding, a verdict may not be based on secret evidence: "[t]he
Government which prosecutes an accused also has the duty to see
that justice is done, it is unconscionable to allow it to undertake
prosecution and then invoke its governmental privileges to deprive
the accused of anything which might be material to his defense."'
1 I
In other words, the government must refrain from invoking its
privilege in relation to investigative material. The fact that the
prosecution might be precluded from using this material as
evidence will not affect the interests of the accused. The accused is
interested in seeing all the material and exercising his own
discretion as to which evidence may be useful to him in his
defense.
Likewise, the Patriot Act enables a person to be detained for
up to seven days without any judicial process whatsoever, subject
only to the authorization of the Attorney General who may extend
that detention for up to half a year".2 in complete opposition to the
Fifth".3 and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution." 4
The dangers arising out of this provision are threefold. First,
as we have seen, there is apparently no longer any need for
probable cause in order to detain a person."5 Second, there is no
judicial examination prior to carrying out the detention; the
detention is ordered without a warrant and only upon the
authorization of the Attorney General. Third, and most serious, is
110 Michael J. Whidden, Unequal Justice: Arabs in America and United States
Antiterrorism Legislation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2825, 2848 (2001) (quoting David Cole,
INS Terrorizes Arabs in the US., Legal Times, May 18, 1998, at 167).
I"i United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1952).
112 Immigration and Nationality Act of 2000 § 236A, 8 U.S.C. 1101, amended by
Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools Required To
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. § 412(a)(1)-(a)(6) (2001).
113 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
114 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
115 Immigration and Nationality Act of 2000 § 236A.
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the fact that there is no genuine judicial review shortly after the
detention-contrary to the well-known rulings interpreting the
Constitution in this area.
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution does not prohibit
detention; it prohibits unreasonable detention.116 The inevitable
question is what is unreasonable detention? Who will determine
what is reasonable? Detention without a warrant is not necessarily
an unreasonable detention. American law recognizes the
reasonableness of a detention if the police officer detaining the
person has probable cause to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the person to be arrested committed it. 117
However, the Patriot Act. refers to suspicion, and suspicion
cannot constitute probable cause. 18 To justify detention without a
warrant, there must be evidence known to the police officer
carrying out the detention which reasonably supports the suspicion
that an offense has been committed and that there is legal
justification for taking the person into custody.'19 The evidence
need not give rise to a degree of certainty which is beyond any
reasonable doubt, but at the least, it must cause a reasonable
person in the shoes of the police officer to believe that an offense
was committed. The fact that the Patriot Act waives this
requirement and does away with the line separating bare suspicion
from reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause is a
significant exception to the general rule as to what is a reasonable
detention. Indeed, the number of detentions in the United States
following September- 11, 2001, shows that the exception is in the
process of becoming the rule. Without the Patriot Act, this process
would be regarded as an unreasonable detention, and it is unclear
whether the Patriot Act is entitled to defy the requirement of
probable cause. This.is because "[t]he [Fourth Amendment] does
draw the line against warrantless arrests made without 'probable
cause.' The standard for arrest is 'probable cause,' and it is one
that the legislature itself may not override.1 2 °
Legal logic would demand that if a statute waives the
116 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
117 United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976).
118 Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100, 104 (1959).
119 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963).
120 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 242 (1972).
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requirement for an arrest warrant and the need for probable cause
in order to carry out the arrest, the statute should at least demand
that the detainee be brought before a judge immediately upon
being taken into custody to allow a judge to consider the legality
of the arrest. In cases of an arrest made without a warrant but upon
probable cause, the law compels immediate judicial review of the
arrest. The absence of probable cause only strengthens the need
for such review: "[t]he next step in the proceeding is to arraign the
arrested person before a judicial officer as quickly as possible so
that he may be advised of his rights and so that the issue of
probable cause may be promptly determined." 21
The Patriot Act, however, enables the authorities to wait seven
days before arraigning the detainee, and with the authorization of
the Attorney General, the authorities can wait for an additional six
months, renewable over an unlimited period, of time.122 This is
completely contrary to Gerstein v. Pugh, 123 which stands for the
principle that the right to judicial review of the legality of
detention is a constitutional right:
[Gerstein] holds that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
require a timely judicial determination of probable cause as a
prerequisite to extended restraint on liberty following arrest. A
state procedure is invalid when it provides that a person arrested
and charged by information may be jailed or subjected to other
restraints pending trial without opportunity for a judicial
probable cause determination.1 24
The Patriot Act expressly opposes this principle, and thereby
severely harms an individual's right to liberty. Such harm may
continue for a lengthy period of time, and in the absence of
appropriate judicial review, there is a grave danger that it will be
unearthed as a mistake only after many years have elapsed.
In addition to this harm, the Patriot Act erodes the scope of the
protection given to the rights of the accused. The well-known
principles concerning the rights of an accused, particularly his
right to due process prior to being deprived of his liberty were first
developed during the tenure of Chief Justice Warren:
121 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 454 (1957).
122 USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 2, at § 412.
123 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
124 SCHWARTZ, supra note 120, at 246-47.
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Given the almost total lack of concern by state courts for rights
of the accused prior to the 1950s, one can see that the Warren
Court, in breathing life back into the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, tried to create a set of rigid prophylactic rules
which, if followed by police and prosecutors, would meet the
basic requirements of the Constitution. 1
25
The Warren Court was responsible for the major cases
protecting the majority of the rights of the accused: the right to an
attorney, appointed by the State in the case of indigence; 126 the
right to remain silent; 127 the right to be informed that all
statements can be used against a suspect; and the right to be
informed that a suspect is under no compulsion to speak. 8
Although the Patriot Act does not expressly repudiate these
rights, the indirect impact of the Patriot Act is likely to be that
most of these rights will be void of effect. When a person knows
that he may be detained for an unlimited period of time without
any judicial process whatsoever, can he take advantage of the right
to remain silent? Is he not subject to pressure to speak and divulge
information? The Patriot Act also has ramifications regarding the
protection afforded by the Constitution against self-incrimination.
In 1993, the Supreme Court emphasized that: "[i]n protecting a
defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,
Miranda safeguards 'a fundamental trial right.' "129
After the enactment of the Patriot Act, the Attorney General
issued a decision enabling the monitoring of communications
between attorneys and suspects. 3 ° Does this decision make the
right to meet with counsel a dead letter? The operative result of
this decision may be draconian in terms of the constitutional right
to proper representation; it is difficult to imagine that an attorney
would be willing to represent a defendant knowing that all of their
communications were being taped. Steven Kimelman, formerly a
125 MELVIN L. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 994 (Oxford University Press 2002).
126 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that, at least in all felony
prosecutions, an indigent defendant must be appointed counsel).
127 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
128 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
129 Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 691 (1993).
130 Bureau of Prisons Regulation, 66 Fed. Reg. 211, 55061 (Oct. 31, 2001).
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federal prosecutor and now a criminal defense lawyer, explains:
No criminal defense lawyer can provide adequate assistance of
counsel if the attorney and his or her client know the adversary
(the Justice Department) is monitoring every word that they say
or write to each other. There is ample judicial precedent for this
proposition, and every practicing lawyer knows it's just that
simple. I seriously doubt whether an attorney could even
ethically undertake to represent someone with these restrictions
in place. 131
E. Protection Against Unreasonable Search
A distinction must be drawn between two scenarios: one,
where a search is conducted outside the borders of the United
States; the other, where a search is conducted within the United
States.
Regarding the first scenario, notwithstanding that it is
generally thought that if the search is conducted by a United States
government agent then it will be generally subject to the Fourth
Amendment, 3 2 the U.S. Supreme Court found that: "[t]he Fourth
Amendment was not relevant in evaluating the legality of a United
States-directed search in Mexico of a Mexican citizen's residence
who had no substantial voluntary attachment to the United States,
despite the fact that he was being prosecuted in our courts."' 33
One must ask whether an American citizen residing outside the
borders of the United States is not also entitled to the protection of
the Fourth Amendment. While there is an objective difficulty in
obtaining a search warrant from a judge, since citizens residing
outside the country are not subject to the court's jurisdiction,
Executive Order 12,333 empowers the Attorney General to
authorize activities against a citizen located abroad, 134 on condition
that "there is probable cause to believe that the technique is
directed against a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.' 35
131 Steven Kimelman, Protecting Privilege, NAT'L L.J., December 3, 2001, at A21.
132 Ronald J. Sievert, Meeting the Twenty First Century Terrorist Threat Within the
Scope of Twentieth Century Constitutional Law, 37 Hous. L. REv. 1421, 1431-32
(2000).
133 Id. at 1432.
134 Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981).
135 Id. at 59,951.
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The accepted approach by the courts is that even a citizen
located abroad is entitled to the protection of the Constitution:
"[w]hen the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is
abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the
Constitution provide.., should not be stripped away just because
he happens to be in another land.' 13 6
In the second scenario, where the search is conducted within
the territory of the United States and all constitutional protections
apply, the violation of rights protected by the Fourth Amendment
must meet the requirements of probable cause, which shall be
discussed below in connection with the infringement on a person's
right to privacy when his or her home is searched.
F. The Violation of the Right to Privacy
Many of the provisions of the Patriot Act sanction an
infringement of privacy by means of monitoring and wire-tapping.
These practices are carried out without satisfying once-applicable
requirements. While it is still necessary to obtain a warrant in
order to conduct a search, the court has been deprived of its
substantive discretion and has been left with only its formal
discretion: "[m]any provisions of the USA-PATRIOT Act limit
judicial review of law enforcement activities altogether, or create
the illusion of judicial review while transforming judges into mere
rubber stamps. '
By the 1980s, investigative and law enforcement agencies did
not require warrants if the purpose of monitoring was to gather
foreign intelligence: "[i]n such cases, the government has the
greatest need for speed, stealth,' and secrecy, and the surveillance
in such cases is most likely to call into play difficult and subtle
judgments about foreign and military affairs.' 38 However, the
Patriot Act expands this authority by removing the distinction
between monitoring for investigative purposes and monitoring for
the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence. The result is that:
Under the new law only a 'significant purpose,' as opposed to
'the purpose' of the investigation is needed to sidestep the
warrant requirement': Law enforcement can now wiretap a
136 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957).
137 Weich, supra note 6.
138 United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 915 (4th Cir. 1980).
[Vol. 28
TERRORIST ATTACKS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
United States citizen, without a criminal warrant, when the
primary purpose of the wiretap is for criminal investigation. This
fundamental shift poses a serious threat to our constitutionally
protected privacy rights and alters the checks and balances
critical to our governmental structure.
1 39
The absence of effective judicial review may lead to activities
that seriously and unnecessarily infringe on an individual's
privacy rights. When the investigative authorities are allowed to
engage in monitoring without probable cause, they thereby risk an
improper exercise of power. This is completely contrary to the
principle of protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment prior to
the enactment of the Patriot Act:
In cases in which the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant
to search be obtained, 'probable cause' is the standard by which
a particular decision to search is tested against the constitutional
mandate of reasonableness . . . in determining whether a
particular inspection is reasonable - and thus in determining
whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant for that
inspection - the need for the inspection must be weighed in'
terms of these reasonable goals of code enforcement.14 0
It is possible that in the current state of affairs, where terrorist
attacks endanger the safety of the public, a more flexible
examination will be conducted as to the existence of probable
cause, and it will not be necessary to meet the high standard
required for other criminal offenses. This approach might be
acceptable to the courts: "[i]t may be that Congress, for example,
would judge that the application and affidavit showing probable
cause [for security surveillance] need not follow the exact
requirements of section 2518 [Title III for criminal cases], but
should allege other circumstances more appropriate to domestic
security cases . ,,141 However, this relaxation of standards
cannot turn the requirement for probable cause, which appears in
the Fourth Amendment, into an empty phrase. It should be
necessary to prove some circumstances that give rise to fears about
national security and public safety, prior to the court allowing an
order to be issued that will infringe on the privacy of a person in a
139 DAILY RECORD, Nov. 19, 2001, at lB.
140 Camera v. Mun. Court., 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967).
141 United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297,323 (1972).
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severe and perhaps unnecessary way. When Congress enacted the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 4 2 many criticized
the Act as unconstitutional. Although the Act required a court
order to monitor an American citizen or an alien resident, it did
not require probable cause in the same way as, for example, Title
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. Title III
states that the government's standard of proof is a "[s]trict
standard of probable cause to believe that a particular crime is
being committed by a specific individual using an identified phone
or location." 143
Instead, the FISA is satisfied with the existence of facts that
comprise probable cause for believing that: " '[t]he target of the
electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power,' and must certify 'that the purpose of the surveillance is to
obtain foreign intelligence information. . ,,14
Despite the low standard of proof required, the Court has
confirmed that where surveillance is needed for the purpose of
protecting national security, there is no need for the same level of
probable cause required by Title 1Ii. 14
Judicial review of government actions should also be required
when the actions concern national security, if only because of the
fear that such actions might infringe on an individual's right to
privacy based merely on an assertion of national security.
However, the court may expose other concealed motives and
"[t]he Supreme Court, in United States v. United States District
Court, held that the Government did not have unlimited power to
conduct national security wiretaps and that it would be required in
most circumstances to obtain the issuance of a warrant by the
judiciary before utilizing this surveillance technique., 146
The central question is what level of suspicion must the court
142 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (1994).
143 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
144 United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 789 (9th Cir. 1987).
145 "The governmental interests in gathering foreign intelligence are of paramount
importance to national security, and may differ substantially from those presented in the
normal criminal investigation." United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1075 (4th Cir.
1987).
146 Sievert, supra note 132, at 1436 (citing United States v. United States Dist.
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 323-24 (1972)).
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demand of the government in order to allow it, for example, to
engage in wiretaps? Many years before the enactment of the
Patriot Act, voices were heard to the effect that in national security
cases, it was sufficient to prove a lower level of suspicion than that
needed in relation to ordinary criminal offenses.'47 However, what
is the level of suspicion, and what degree of probable cause is
needed, when the offense is terrorism which threatens national
security? Is the test reasonable suspicion which may be interpreted
in accordance with the circumstances of each case? The Ninth
Circuit held that: "[r]easonableness, not probable cause, is
undoubtedly the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment."' 48 Or, is
the test a higher level of suspicion? A higher level of suspicion
would require "substantial evidence that would convince a
reasonable man that a crime is about to be committed and that the
defendant is the one who will commit it.''
149
When these questions arise against the background of
international terrorism, it is difficult to obtain the information
necessary to meet the strict standard of probable cause. 5 °
Terrorism involves a network that covers the world, and it is not
always possible to point to the specific person who intends to
commit a specific act. Does this problem justify demanding a
degree of suspicion, which is reasonable in the circumstances of
the case, i.e., circumstances involving terrorism so that any
suspicion would be a reasonable suspicion?
The Patriot Act reflects a willingness to be satisfied with any
level of suspicion since one may presume that the legislature
would not adopt empty language.' 5' The purpose of the legislation
was to supply law enforcement agencies with tools to assist them
in their fight against terrorism. This view was based on the
presumption that the measures available prior to the enactment of
the Act did not enable the proper and effective handling of the
dangers that took their toll on September 11, 2001. If this is the
147 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
148 United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1092 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1995).
149 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) ("[P]robable cause . requires that
the facts available to the officer would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief.
.. ).
150 See Pelton, 835 F.2d at 1075.
151 See Barona, 56 F.3d at 1092.
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case, the purpose of the legislation was certainly not to restate the
stringent requirements of probable cause, as this already had been
deprived of effect with regard to terrorism offenses. 5 2 The
inescapable conclusion is that the statutory purpose was to further
reduce the standard of suspicion needed to any suspicion per se. In
the aftermath of September 11, any suspicion was reasonable
suspicion, and it already has been said that reasonableness lies at
the heart of the Fourth Amendment. 53 Hints of this may be found
in reference to the powers of the Attorney General, where the Act
uses the expression: "reasonable ground to believe."'54 From this
language, many critics of the Patriot Act have concluded that the
level of suspicion needed is significantly different from traditional
probable cause, thereby severely impairing the proper balance
between human rights and national security. Thus, for example:
[F]or Lawrence S. Lustberg, President of the Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey, the law tips the scales
against civil liberties, effectively playing into the hands of
terrorists bent on derailing democratic systems. 'There are
general tests of reasonableness or balancing tests for wiretaps.
When that balancing act is changed, terrorism has won,' he said.
155
The result is that the Patriot Act, which requires a court order
authorizing the infringement of the protected constitutional rights
of a person and in particular the right to privacy and the right not
to be searched, is satisfied with a magistrate's order or the order of
a FISA judge. Prior to the Patriot Act, the order was also given
without proof of probable cause. 156 Today, on the assumption that
the Patriot Act is intended to modify and not to preserve the
existing situation, these orders will be given on the basis of an
even lower degree of suspicion. This is a difficult outcome and a
grave violation of human rights, particularly in light of the fact
152 See Pelton, 835 F.2d at 1075.
153 See Barona, 56 F.3d at 1092.
154 USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 2, at § 412 (amending the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.S. 1101 (2002)).
155 Maria Vogel-Short, A Collision Course? Public Safety vs. Civil Liberties, NEW
JERSEY LAWYER, Nov. 5, 2001, at 1.
156 In the year 2000, out of one thousand applications for a wiretap order, only one
application was rejected. Id. (citing report from the Center for Democracy and
Technology).
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that the erosion of the right to privacy that took place in 1996 in
the AEDPA is deepened further in the Patriot Act. Despite
President Clinton's proposal that a single wiretap authorization be
instituted, the AEDPA, "allowed roving wiretaps of suspected
terrorists instead of requiring a new court order for each new
wiretap location."' 57
Even though the AEDPA rejected Clinton's proposal,' the
Patriot Act provided that:
[R]oving wiretaps no longer have to be obtained within specific
jurisdictions. A single wiretap authorization can be used for the
targeted individual. The law increases law enforcement's ability
to tap a person's home, business and cell phone - even the phone
of someone that person is visiting, all within a single application
to a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act judge or a U.S.
magistrate. 15
9
Even though it was known prior to the Patriot Act that a police
officer or other competent investigative officer was required to be
equipped with a specific warrant to conduct a search, the Court
already held by a majority opinion 6 ' in 1947 that in cases where
police officers entered into an apartment with a valid warrant with
the intention of searching for a particular type of evidence, and
found different evidence, they could use that material in order to
charge the suspect with another offense. The minority judges
argued that the doctrine violated the intent of the Fourth
Amendment and, in essence, gave police a roving warrant.'6' This
minority opinion became law a year later,'62 and a specific search
warrant was required. There is no doubt that the Patriot Act is an
innovation which has more severe consequences for human rights
than the AEDPA.
This article shall now turn to a comparative look at the anti-
157 See Smith, supra note 86, at 259-78 (review of the bill through to the final
draft).
158 Lawrence M. O'Rourke, Anti-Terrorism Bill on President's Desk, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Apr. 19, 1996, at Al.
159 Vogel-Short, supra note 155, at 1; see also USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 2, at
§ 219 (referring to single jurisdiction search warrants for terrorism).
160 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S 145, 155 (1947).
161 See id. at 156.
162 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-17 (1948).
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terrorist legislation in Britain and Israel; thereafter it will examine
whether, in light of human rights violations authorized by the
Patriot Act, the new balance introduced is proper.
IV. A Comparative Look: Britain and Israel Contending with
Terrorism
A. Britain
There are those who argue that the U.S. anti-terrorist
legislation, commencing in 1996 with the AEDPA, has imitated
legislative models introduced in Britain to combat terrorism.' 63
Indeed, a review of the laws in Britain brings to the fore multiple
similarities with the AEDPA and the Patriot Act.' 64 In section A,
this article will discuss Britain's legislative methods of coping
with terrorism, the extent of the harm to human rights ensuing
from this legislation, and the great similarity between the practices
adopted in Britain to cope with terrorism and the measures
introduced by the AEDPA and the Patriot Act.
Prior to specifying the various statutes and the extent to which
they harm human rights, we must recall the central difference
between the United States and Britain. Until 1998, British law
was not subject to a supreme constitution or bill of rights. Despite
the absence of these formal documents, prior to 1998, the British
government was committed to refraining from harming human
rights and civil liberties by virtue of the European Convention on
Human Rights, which Britain joined in consequence of pressure
exerted on it by the European Court of Human Rights.'65 In 1998,
Britain formally incorporated the Convention into its domestic
law, and since then the Convention is treated as a bill of rights in
Britain.'66 The Convention entrenches the duty of a State to
guarantee and protect a citizen's right to life,'67 as well as other
163 Gregory C. Clark, History Repeating Itself. The Devolution of Recent British and
American Antiterrorist Legislation, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 247, 273-274 (1999).
164 See id.
165 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention].
166 Kevin Dooley Kent, Basic Rights and Anti-Terrorism Legislation: Can Britain's
Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act 1998 Be Reconciled With Its Human
Rights Act?, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 221, 225 (2000).
167 Article 2 of the Convention provides:
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human rights, infringements of which are prohibited by the
Convention.168 All this is subject to one exception: Article 15 of
the Convention states that in time of war or other times of
emergency that threaten the life of the nation, measures may be
used which violate human rights.'69 All this is subject to scrutiny in
accordance with the Convention. In practice, the rights protected
by the Convention were also respected as a matter of English
common law, including the right to privacy and family life, 7'
freedom of expression,"' freedom of movement, 7 2 the right to
individual freedom and protection against arbitrary detention,'73
(1) Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived
of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following
his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. (2)
Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this
article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely
necessary: (a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order to
effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; (c)
in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.
European Convention, supra note 165, at 224.
168 Personal freedom is guaranteed in article five. Freedom of movement is
expressly granted in protocol four, article two. Respect for family life is protected under
article eight. Freedom of expression is in article ten and due process is protected in
article six. European Convention, supra note 165, at 226.
169 Article 15 provides:
(1) In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation
any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations
under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other
obligation under international law. (2) No derogation from Article 2, except in
respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or from Article 3, 4
(paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made under this provision. (3) Any High
Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation shall keep the
Secretary General of the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures
which it has taken and the reasons therefore. It shall also inform the Secretary
General of the Council of Europe when such measures have ceased to operate
and the provisions of the Convention are again being fully executed.
European Convention, supra note 165, at 233.
170 Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817-18 (1765).
171 R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't Ex p. Brind, 2 W.L.R. 588, 594
(1991).
172 Magna Carta, 1215, ch. 42.
173 Christie v. Leachinsky, [1947] 1 App. Cas. 573, 587, 591, 600.
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and the right to a fair trial.174
The United Kingdom Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) was
the first act providing the executive branch with tools having a
significant impact on human rights with the intention of dealing in
a more efficient manner with terrorism. The PTA outlawed two
organizations, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Irish
National Liberation Army (INLA), and granted broad powers of
arrest, detention, and deportation against suspected terrorists.
According to human rights organizations, these powers were
ineffective but had the manifest outcome of violating human
rights. Of all the detentions carried out, 95 percent of the
detainees were found to be innocent, and the government failed to
prove that the remaining 5 percent would not have been arrested
save for the means offered by the PTA.'75
The most prominent similarity between the PTA and the
Patriot Act is the provision enabling a terrorist suspect to be held
in detention for up to seven days without bringing him before a
judge. In November 1988, the European Court of Human Rights
held that this provision was in breach of the European Convention
on Human Rights. Preceding the 1984 provision was a 1974
provision,"' which enabled a person to be detained for up to forty-
eight hours. Detention could be extended for an additional five
days without judicial review only upon an order to that effect
being issued by the government. In the 1988 case, four residents
of Northern Ireland were held for periods ranging from four to
sixteen days without being brought before a judge. All four were
released without charges being brought. The decision relied on the
fact that Britain had signed the European Convention on Human
Rights.177
In 1989, Britain amended the statutory provisions within the
framework of the PTA. 178 The latter Act has a variety of
174 The term commonly used for this in English law is "natural justice" or
"procedural fairness." See also Council for Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil
Service 3 All E. R. 935 (1984).
175 Caleb M. Pilgram, Terrorism in National and International Law, 8 DICK. J.
INT'LL. 147, 190 (1990).
176 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1974, ch. 56, 7.
177 Karen De Young, European Court Rules Against British Law; Anti -Terrorism
Measure Said to Violate Rights, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 1988, at A25.
178 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, ch. 4.
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significant provisions that empower the Secretary of State to issue
exclusion orders against persons believed to be connected with
terrorism; prohibits financial assistance for terrorism; and allows a
police officer to arrest without a warrant a person whom the
officer reasonably suspects of being associated with the
commission, preparation, or instigation of terrorist acts. The PTA
also criminalizes failure to disclose to the police information that
may prevent acts of terrorism or may aid in the apprehension,
prosecution, or conviction of a terrorist offense.'79
Like the main criticism directed toward American anti-terrorist
legislation, the primary criticism of the British Act focused on the
absence of judicial review and the severe harm that might thereby
be caused to human rights:
Critics also contend that the Secretary of State's right to issue
exclusion orders, without court review, against British citizens
and non-citizens from being in or entering the United Kingdom,
is a violation of civil rights. Exclusion orders deprive certain
people of the right to move freely around the United Kingdom
and to live where they please. The evidence against them is not
tested in a court of law nor made known to the person excluded
and it is possible that some of it may be inaccurate.'80
Contrary to the Patriot Act, which itself includes provisions
infringing on privacy, and authorizes eavesdropping and
monitoring, the equivalent British provisions appear in a separate
statute-the Interception of Communication Act of 1985.8l Until
1985, eavesdropping had been prohibited by English law. The Act
provides that eavesdropping is a criminal offense unless it is
carried out under an order issued by the Secretary of State. Such
an order will be given in the following circumstances: "(a) in the
interests of national security; (b) for the purpose of preventing or
detecting serious crime; or (c) for the purpose of safeguarding the
economic well-being of the United Kingdom."''
82
In 1996, following a new terrorist attack by the IRA, the
British government initiated new legislation - the Northern Ireland
179 Graham Zellick, Spies, Subversives, Terrorists and the British Government: Free
Speech and Other Casualties, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 773, 812-17 (1990).
180 Smith, supra note 86, at 279-80.
181 Interception of Communication Act of 1985, ch. 56.
182 Id., § 2(2).
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Emergency Provisions Act, 1973 (EPA), containing most of the
provisions of the earlier legislation mentioned above but
conferring some new powers on the security forces to enable them
to deal with Northern Ireland terrorism. The combination of
provisions of the two Acts creates a harsh picture of violations of
human rights. The EPA grants the police and security forces broad
powers of search, arrest, and detention which can be carried out
without court orders and without the need for reasonable
suspicion. 113 The PTA supplements the EPA in the sense that it
grants broad powers to the police to investigate terrorist offenses.
It is sufficient for the police officer to have a reasonable suspicion
that a person supports terrorist activities to empower the officer to
arrest that person without a warrant, notwithstanding that this
person is under no suspicion whatsoever of actually having
committed a particular crime. Despite these broad powers,
confessions will not be admissible in court if evidence is brought
that the confessions were obtained as a result of torture, degrading
treatment, violence or threat of violence.184
Beyond the violation of civil liberties and the right to privacy
resulting from the powers of arrest and interrogation granted by
the Acts, the statutes violate additional rights. One blatant
infringement is of the right to freedom of association. The EPA
outlaws ten organizations, 85 and the PTA outlaws an additional
183 According to the Act, both a police officer and a soldier are empowered to: 1)
enter and search buildings, other than a dwelling house and seize any munitions or radio
transmitters and receivers found therein; 2) stop and search persons in public places and
seize any munitions or radio transmitters and receivers; 3) enter a non-dwelling building
to search for and seize explosives; 4) stop and search persons in public places and seize
explosives; 5) enter any premises to search for detained persons; 6) stop and question
persons anywhere to ascertain identity, movements or knowledge of terrorist incidents;
and, 7) enter any premises in the course of operations for preservation of peace or
maintenance of order. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996, ch. 22, §§ 17-
24 (Eng.).
184 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996, ch. 22, § 12(2)(b) (Eng.).
185 Organizations proscribed by the EPA are the Irish Republican Army, Red Hand
Commandos, Cumann na mBan, Fianna Na mBan, Saor Eire, Ulster Freedom Fighters,
Ulster Volunteer Force, Irish National Liberation Army, Irish People's Liberation
Organization, and the Ulster Defense Force. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions)
Act 1996, ch. 22 § 30(2) sched. 2 (Eng.). See also Northern Ireland (Emergency
Provisions) Act 1996, ch. 22 § 30(4) sched. 2 (Eng.) (the Secretary of State may add or
remove organizations from this list).
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two. 86 The EPA specifies the ramifications of outlawing an
organization for freedom of association, as follows:
When an organization is listed, it becomes illegal for any person
to: (a) belong to the organization, (b) solicit support for the
organization, (c) solicit membership or carry out orders of the
organization, (d) address any meeting of three or more persons
knowing that the meeting is to: i) support a proscribed
organization, ii) further the activities of proscribed organization,
or iii) be addressed by a member of a proscribed organization.'87
One outcome of this restriction on freedom of association is
that it also restricts freedom of expression: "[t]he media has been
prohibited from broadcasting words spoken by representatives of
proscribed organizations, or any statements supporting proscribed
organizations."'88 The EPA and the PTA expressly prohibit
members of the public from wearing emblems or writing articles
that create reasonable grounds for believing that the person
concerned is a member of or supports the organization which has
been outlawed.'89
Any support, including financial support, for terrorist acts or
for organizations that have been outlawed is illegal. The EPA
authorizes the attachment of all revenues linked to terrorist
activities.'9" Like the Patriot Act, the PTA also discharges banks
from liability for breaches of the duty of confidentiality and
encourages them to divulge information regarding assets suspected
of being used for terrorist activities.' 9'
The last in this series of anti-terrorist legislation is the
Criminal Justice Terrorism and Conspiracy Act of 1998 (CJTCA).
Resembling the context in which the Patriot Act was enacted, this
statute was enacted in record time against the background of a
186 The IRA and INLA were organizations outlawed by the 1984 Act. Prevention of
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, ch. 4, § 1, sched. 1 (Eng.).
187 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996, ch. 22, § 30(1)(a)-(d),
sched. 2 (Eng.).
188 Matthew H. James, Keeping the Peace-British, Israeli, and Japanese Legislative
Responses to Terrorism, 15 DICK. J. INT'L. 405, 422-23 (1997).
189 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996, c. 22 §§ 31 (a)(b), 32(1), 35,
sched. 2 (Eng.).
190 James, supra note 188, at 426.
191 Id. at 425.
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bombing spree launched against Britain by a Northern Ireland
group that claimed the lives of twenty-nine people, followed
shortly afterwards by the attack on the U.S. Embassies in Kenya
and Tanzania. Also playing a part in the enactment of the CJTCA
was world pressure which claimed that Britain was providing a
safe haven for the planning of terrorist attacks.'92
British anti-terrorist legislation is contrary to a number of
provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights. The
most patent variances are found in the CJTCA, which ironically
was enacted at the same time that Britain adopted the European
Convention of Human Rights into its domestic law.'93 The British
courts cannot nullify legislation solely for being contraryto the
Convention, but they must always give preference to a
construction that is consistent with the Convention as opposed to
one that is not.'94 Under the CJTCA, it is possible to convict
persons suspected of involvement in terrorist organizations, a
modification which is apparently contrary to Article 6 of the
Convention, which establishes a right to due process.'95
192 Kent, supra note 166, at 227.
193 See Human Rights Act 1998, ch. 42 (Eng.).
194 Id. at § 3.
195 Article 6 provides:
(1) In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be
excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or
national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the
protection of the private lives of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly
necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity
would prejudice the interests of justice. (2) Everyone charged with a criminal
offense shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty. (3) Everyone charged
with a criminal offense has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed
promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for
the preparation of his defense; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal
assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal
assistance, to.be given it free when the interests of justice so required; (d) to
examine or have examined witnesses on his behalf under the same condition as
witnesses against him; (e) have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot
understand or speak the language used in court.
Human Rights Act 1998, ch. 42, Article 6, sched. 1 (Eng.).
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First, the CJTCA violates the right to freedom of association
and prohibits membership of organizations that are listed by the
Secretary of State.196 The CJTCA prohibits "conspiracy to commit
terrorist offenses" but does not define precisely what these terms
mean, thereby leading to the possibility of an unnecessary
infringement of the right to freedom of association. Articles ten
and eleven of the European Convention enable a State to restrict
the exercise of the right to freedom of association when such
restrictions are necessary in a democratic State to protect national
security, territorial independence, or public safety. However, any
restriction of these rights must be made as narrow as possible, use
the least drastic measures, and be effective for the least possible
amount of time.
In order to convict a person of membership in an organization
listed by the Secretary of State, the CJTCA authorizes a police
officer to testify that: "[iun his opinion, the accused ... belongs to
an organization which is specified, or ... belonged at a particular
time to an [organization] which was then specified." '197 Such
testimony is admissible and is evidence of the content of the
statement, although a person cannot be convicted solely on the
basis of such police testimony.198 The CJTCA thus turns a police
officer into an expert witness who is authorized not only to testify
to the facts in his possession but also to give his interpretation and
opinion on those facts.
The CJTCA is even more far-reaching in its provisions
infringing the right of an accused to maintain silence. In order to
establish whether the accused belongs to a listed organization, a
jury may draw negative conclusions from the silence of the
accused during interrogation.'99 This silence during interrogation
196 Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act 1998, c. 40, § 1 (1) (Eng.).
197 Id. at § 1 (2).
198 Id. at § 1 (3).
199 Id. at § 1 (4):
[T]he jury may draw adverse inferences where: (a) at any time before being
charged with the offense the accused, on being questioned under caution by a
constable, failed to mention a fact which is material to the offense and which he
could reasonably be expected to mention, and (b) before being questioned he
was permitted to consult a solicitor."). See also Criminal Justice (Terrorism and
Conspiracy) Act 1998, c. 40, § 1 (5) (Eng.) (an inference may be drawn where:
"(a) on being charged with an offense 'or informed by a constable that he might
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may occur in two circumstances: first, where the suspect is
interrogated prior to being charged and prior to being allowed to
see a lawyer, and second, after being charged or after the suspect
has been informed by a police officer that he would probably be
charged and he was interrogated after being allowed to see a
lawyer. In these cases; however, the accused may not be
convicted solely by reason of his silence. °°
Article 6 of the Convention does not expressly provide for a
suspect's right to silence; however, the European Court of Human
Rights has extrapolated this right from Article 6: "[t]he right to
remain silent under police questioning and the privilege against
self-incrimination are generally [recognized] international
standards that lie at the heart of the notion of fair procedure under
Article 6. "2°1
Subject to one reservation, it follows that using the silence of a
suspect against him is a flagrant breach of article six. As the
European Court has also agreed, the right to silence is not
absolute. A review of British legislation and case law on this issue
shows that conclusions may only be drawn from the silence of the
accused when the prosecution has proven a prima facie case
against the accused, which is defined as:
a case which is strong enough to go to a jury, i.e., a case
consisting of direct evidence which, if believed and combined
with legitimate inferences based upon it, could lead a properly
directed jury to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt ... that
each of the essential elements of the offense is proved.20 2
As noted, the CJTCA itself does not allow a conviction to be
based solely on the silence of the accused. It requires that the
accused be allowed to exercise his right to meet an attorney prior
to being interrogated, thereby enabling the attorney to advise and
caution him that his silence may also be used against him apart
be prosecuted the accused failed to mention a fact which is material to the
offense and which he could reasonably be expected to mention, and (b) before
being charged or informed he was permitted to consult a solicitor.
Id.
200 Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act 1998, c. 40, § 1 (6) (b) (Eng.).
201 Murray v. United Kingdom, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. 29, 60 (1996).
202 Murray v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 97 Crim. App. R. 151, 154 (U.K.
1992).
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from the additional evidence held by the prosecution. In my
opinion, this fact neutralizes the fears arising from the breach of
article six of the Convention. However, it is not clear as to what
may amount to a prima facie case for the purposes of the CJTCA,
if one assumes that the definition previously set forth may be
revised in view of the evolving reality of fear of terrorism
becoming a central component of national life. In that reality, a
breach of article six is not impossible.
A separate breach of the right of the accused to a fair
procedure and fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention is
reflected in the fact that, under the CJTCA, the prosecution is
authorized to make use of secret evidence, and thereby infringing
the right of the accused to effectively cross-examine witnesses and
disturbing the balance of power between the prosecution and the
defense.203
Prior to the enactment of the CJTCA, British law required the
disclosure to the accused of all relevant information which might
have an influence on the defense or be connected to the
circumstances of the case."o However, in certain circumstances
where the disclosure of the evidence would be contrary to the
public interest, for example, where disclosure of the evidence
would reveal the source of the police information thereby
endangering the life of the informant or causing him to cease
operating as an informant, secret evidence could be used.2"5
The CJTCA allows an impression to be obtained from the
testimony of a police officer for the purpose of gaining a
conviction, thus the right to a fair trial is severely infringed in
those cases where the opinion is based on secret evidence. Fear of
such a result is heightened in light of the Attorney General's
guidelines defining "sensitive material" which need not be
disclosed should such disclosure be contrary to the public interest.
206 One example of this is where the material deals with a matter
203 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
204 Attorney General's Guidelines Disclosure of Information to the Defense in Cases
to be Tried on Indictment, 74 Crim. App. R. 302, 302 (U.K. 1982) [hereinafter Attorney
General's Guidelines].
205 See R. v. Hennessey, 68 Crim. App. R. 419, 425 (1978).
206 A statement contains sensitive material if:
(a) it deals with matters of national security; or it is by, or discloses the identity
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of national security. Clearly, this will be the primary material in a
case concerning terrorist offenses and therefore the use of secret
evidence in CJTCA trials will be routine. The Attorney General
requires a balance to be drawn between the level of sensitivity of
the material and the extent to which this material is likely to assist
the defense of the accused. In close cases, the material must be
disclosed.0 7 British case law in this regard indicates that the courts
do not have a problem with secret evidence where it is designed to
protect the identity of a police informant unless exposure of his
identity is likely to assist the accused to prove his innocence or
prevent a miscarriage of justice.2"8
Where a police officer gives an opinion that the accused is a
member of a terrorist organization on the basis of secret evidence
or on the basis of information supplied by intelligence sources
which cannot be revealed, and that opinion may support a
conviction, the danger of a miscarriage of justice is great. Yet, the
public interest demands that secrecy be maintained. The likelihood
of the accused succeeding in proving that his interest in exposing
the intelligence source overrides the interest in protecting the
source and the public interest in general is extremely low:
[I]n many of these situations it is likely that the balance may
favor non-disclosure. This is due to the nature of prosecutions
for terrorists offenses. They often involve information flowing
from highly confidential intelligence sources .... Also there will
be a great need to keep the identities of informers confidential
due to the reputation of certain paramilitary and terrorist
organizations of exacting revenge on informers.2 °9
In the light of the circumstances in which the statute was
of, a member of the Security Services who would be of no further use to those
Services once his identity became known. (b) [i]t is by, or discloses the identity
of, a witness and there are reasons for fearing that disclosure of his identity
would put him orhis family in danger. (c) [i]t is by, or discloses the identity of,
a witness who might be in danger of assault or intimidation if his identity
become known. (d) [i]t contains details which, if they become known, might
facilitate the commission of other offenses... or it discloses some unusual form
of surveillance or method of detecting crime.
Attorney General's Guidelines, supra note 204, at 303.
207 Id. at 304.
208 R. v. Keane, 99 Crim. App. R. 1 (U.K. 1994).
209 Kent, supra note 166, at 243-244.
[Vol. 28
TERRORIST ATTACKS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
enacted, the spread of international terrorism and the real threat it
poses to the nations of the free world, there is a genuine danger
that the use of secret evidence to prove guilt will become routine.
Consequently, the rights of the accused under article six of the
Convention may be severely infringed, even in cases where in
retrospect it is clear that the authorities could have refrained from
such an infringement, and enabled the accused to exercise his right
to a fair and proper trial.
As noted, the court does not have the power to nullify the
CJTCA, notwithstanding that its provisions conflict with the
Convention. However, the court is able to give a restrictive
interpretation to the provisions of the CJTCA. Such an approach is
vital not only in order to enable the accused to exercise his right to
a fair trial in the prevailing circumstances, but also in order to
thwart the terrorists' aspiration to undermine the democratic
values cherished by the free world.
It may be argued that the provisions of the CJTCA are not as
draconian as is asserted here and that a thorough examination of
each provision separately may lead to the conclusion that the
legislature drew the proper balance between national security and
public safety and the rights of the accused, as it is not possible to
convict the accused solely on the basis of his silence or solely
upon the opinion testimony of a police officer.
Such an argument must be rejected. First, the CJTCA does not
state what will be the effect ofa situation in which the silence of
the accused joins the police officer's opinion that the accused is a
member of a terrorist organization. In such a case neither the
silence of the accused nor the opinion of the police officer stands
alone. Is it possible to convict on the basis of their cumulative
weight alone?
Theoretically, such a construction is allowed by the language
of the CJTCA; however, the result would be another flagrant
violation of article six. A reading of the provision concerning sole
reliance on the police officer's opinion does not negate the fear of
a breach of article six; the opposite is true. A careful reading of the
section in the light of the terrorist situation serves to strengthen the
fear. In many cases the opinion of a police officer may be a central
(albeit, not the only) factor on which a conviction is based,
notwithstanding the violation of the principle of equality between
the parties and the right to cross-examine, which itself is
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undermined by the fact that the defense cannot cross-examine the
officer as to the sources upon which he has relied in forming his
opinion. The fear is further strengthened in cases where the officer
may have relied on sources which are not necessarily credible.
The CJTCA reiterates the provisions of the PTA21" regarding
the possibility of detaining a suspect for up to seven days without
bringing him before a judge. In the first 48 hours, the detained
suspect has no right to an attorney or to telephone calls. This
opens the door to the application of enormous psychological
pressure against the suspect to answer the questions of the
interrogators and violates the right of silence of the accused - a
violation which may lead to his conviction in what is not a fair
trial.
Accordingly, it is the function of the court to give meaning to
the silence of the Act in relation to the integration of the evidence.
The court must require direct evidence in addition to the silence of
the accused and/or the opinion of the police officer, which
together will establish a primafacie case.
The courts must be prepared to look behind the bland assertion
and test the evidence on which it is based. Frankly, if the police
are not able or prepared to produce that evidence, it seems to me
that the mere statement is worth nothing and the innocent may
be wrongly convicted.21'
It is interesting to note that the supporters of the CJTCA have
justified their support with the argument that the Act has
successfully balanced the rights of the accused against national
security, because the accused has not been deprived of his right to
meet with an attorney. Home Secretary Jack Straw explained that
the measures offered by the CJTCA are "tightly focused and
proportionate measures which contain safeguards for suspects. '212
This assertion is not precise, because even if the accused meets
with an attorney who explains to him that he has a right to remain
silent but that such silence may be used against him in accordance
210 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, ch. 4, § 14(4)-(5)
(Eng.).
211 Donald Findlay, Cut Crime, Not Corners, SCOTLAND ON SUNDAY, Sept. 6, 1998,
at 15.
212 Geoffrey Bindman, et al., Recognising Rights - A Look at the Progress of the
Human Rights Bill and Analysis of the Impact of the Government 's Rushed Terrorism
Legislation, L. Soc'Y GAZ., Sept. 9, 1998, at 25.
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with the provisions of the Act, such an explanation is a complex
one involving difficult legal issues (for example, what is a material
fact which if not mentioned will allow his silence to be used
against him?). It has been explained that "[t]his will mean not only
that it will be impossible for solicitors to advise their clients
adequately, but that once they have been consulted the clients
themselves will be expected to understand and apply complex
legal principles. Their failure to do so will have dire
consequences."2"3
In the British context, perhaps what is even more interesting is
what has happened to the right to a fair trial in the aftermath of the
terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001.
Britain declared a state of emergency on the ground that the
September attacks were a threat to the entire nation and that
therefore, in accordance with article fifteen of the Convention
(which enables protected rights to be violated in times of
emergency or times of war), Britain could breach article five of the
Convention"4 prohibiting detention without trial and permitting
213 Id.
214 Article 5 provides:
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of the person. No one shall be
deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a
procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after
conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person
for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the
fulfillment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention
of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal
authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offense or when it is
reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offense or fleeing
after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the
purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of
bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of
persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of unsound
mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of
a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorized entry into the country or of a
person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or
extradition. (2) Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a
language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge
against him. (3) Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph l(c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a
judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be
entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may
be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. (4) Everyone who is deprived
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the detention of aliens suspected of terrorism without a trial, in the
vein of the provisions of the Patriot Act.215
The combination of a declaration of this type and the
provisions of the CJTCA undermines the justification found by the
supporters of the CJTCA, and this could have serious
repercussions for the rights of the accused. Such a combination is
likely, defacto, to eradicate them altogether.
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, Britain, in the process
of enacting the Anti-Terror Bill,"6 incorporated both the authority
to detain terrorist suspects and to suspend their right to a fair trial,
as well as numerous provisions enabling the infringement of the
right to privacy, similar to the provisions in the Patriot Act. The
Act will grant the police force powers of surveillance and allow it
to tap telephones and email, as well as obtain a variety of
documents in the possession of the individual.
Terrorism in Britain, as in the United States, has led to
legislation that is the product of hysteria. This legislation brings
terrorism closer to victory in that it significantly erodes democratic
values. Its main disadvantage and the point used most to sharply
criticize the legislation is the lack of a connection ,between the
measures supplied by the legislation to the investigative authorities
and the statutory purpose of preventing and eradicating terrorist
attacks:
The CJTCA is also unlikely to aid in the apprehension of
terrorists or to deter potential terrorists from committing
offenses. . . . In the long run, all that the CJTCA may
accomplish is an increase [in] the number of terrorist
convictions and, given the evidentiary burdens that face these
of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by
which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and
his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. (5) Everyone who has been
victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article
shall have an enforceable right to compensation.
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, art. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 225-28.
215 Richard Ford & Melissa Kite: "Indefinite Internment for Terrorist Suspects",
N.YT, Nov 12, 2001, at Al ("The suspects will be held for six months in a high-security
jail after which their case will be reviewed by the special Immigration Appeals
Commission, headed by a High Court Judge. Further reviews will be held every six
months").
216 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, ch. 24 (Eng.).
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suspects, a corresponding increase in the number of innocent
people falsely convicted.217
In fact, the Act shows a different connection between detention
measures and the possibility of undermining the peace process
between Britain and Ireland. This is the reason for the reluctance
of the police to make use of the powers granted by the Act.28 Even
if this was not the purpose of the CJTCA, it is certainly the result.
Is this the right response to terrorism? I think not!
B. Israel
Since its establishment, the State of Israel has been the victim
of repeated attacks by a variety of terrorist organizations. In recent
years, the wave of terror has increased, and terrorist attacks have
become a matter of routine. On September 11, 2001, the United
States found itself under terrorist attacks which were particularly
horrendous in terms of the number of casualties. Almost every
week, Israel finds itself subjected to attacks that are carried out in
a manner similar to that perpetrated in the United States, i.e., by
suicide bombers. The U.S. legislation is the outcome of the state of
national' emergency in which the United States found itself
following the 11 th of September. Since its establishment in 1948,
Israel has been in a continuous state of emergency. 219 Accordingly,
it is interesting to draw a comparison between the manner in
which Israel has coped with the phenomenon of terrorism within
the country and the manner in which the United States has coped,
as reflected in the Patriot Act.
Israel, unlike the United States, does not have a constitution.
However, in 1992, two central laws were enacted: Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Freedom, and Basic Law: Freedom of
Occupation; this legislation has been termed a "constitutional
revolution" in Israel,22° and it is generally regarded as Israel's
217 Kent, supra note 166, at 271.
218 See Chris McLaughlin & Ted Oliver, "Why Are the Omagh Bombers Still Free
One Year On? Arrests Might Upset the IRA," MAIL ON SUNDAY, Aug. 8, 1999, at 12.
219 The source of the declaration of the state of emergency is Section 9 of the Law
and Administration Ordinance - 1948. This section has been replaced by ISR. CONST.
(Basic Law: The Government, 1999) §§ 49, 50, which allow the Knesset or the
government to declare a state of emergency for a period of a year, with the possibility of
extending it annually.
220 C.A. 6821/93, United Mizrachi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Coop. Vill., 49(4) P.D. 221,
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constitution from which the constitutional rights are derived which
shall be discussed below. It is important to note that these laws are
not constitutive, in the sense of creating human rights in Israel.
Israeli case law gave effect to human rights in the earliest days of
the State.221 But, to a large extent, it can be said that these Basic
Laws raise the normative standard of human rights to a
constitutional standard, and from now on, the normative source of
human rights in Israel is constitutional and clear and can no longer
be held in doubt.
The primary change affected by these laws, a change that is
absent from the U.S. Constitution, is found in the establishment of
a fundamental balancing formula, known as the "limitation
clause." This formula limits the constitutional power of the
Knesset in Israel and prohibits the enactment of a law that
infringes basic rights unless it meets three criteria:222 (a) it accords
with the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic
State; (b) the law is enacted for a proper purpose; and (c) the
statutory infringement of basic rights does not exceed what is
necessary, i.e., it is proportional.
In this section, the article shall examine the influence of
terrorism on such rights in Israel as freedom of expression, the
right to privacy, freedom from having one's home or property
searched, the liberty of a person, and the right to a fair trial. In
cases where this paper concludes that human rights are violated, it
shall examine whether this violation meets the fundamental
balancing test, namely, the limitation clause.
1. Freedom of Expression:
As discussed earlier, in the United States, prior to the anti-
terrorist legislation that infringed the principle of freedom of
265 (author's translation).
221 H.C. 73/53 "Kol-Ha'am" et al. v. Minister of the Interior, 7 P.D. 871 (author's
translation); H.C. 98/69 Bergman v. Minister of Finance 23(1) P.D. 693 (author's
translation).
222 ISR. CONST. (Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom, 1999), § 8:
Infringement of rights: Rights under this Basic Law must not be infringed,
except by a Law that complies with the ethical values of the State of Israel,
which has a valid purpose, and to an extent that does not exceed necessity, or
under an aforesaid Law by virtue of an explicit authorization in it.
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expression, the case law refused to allow such a violation unless a
clear and imminent danger to national security or public safety
was proved.223 In contrast, in Israel the test for violating freedom
of expression is the test of near certainty,224 which, in fact, is the
basis on which the constitutional status of freedom of expression is
founded. This test holds that freedom of expression will only
retreat in the face of national security where two cumulative
conditions are met:225 (a) where, without the imposition of the
restriction, there is a near certainty that national security and
public safety will be harmed; and (b) where the harm is grave,
serious, and severe. Prima facie, this test provides less protection
to freedom of expression than the test of clear and imminent
danger applied in the United States. Ironically, the United States
took a far-reaching approach protecting freedom of expression in
dealing with prior restraint. American case law established a
presumption that every prior restraint is unconstitutional,226
whereas in Israel the courts continue to abide by the test of near
certainty. This was also the case in relation to speech already
uttered. In the United States, criminal liability could attach only
when the speech was seditious and might cause an imminent
breach of the law.227 The requirement of imminence in the United
States thus theoretically protects freedom of expression to a
greater extent than the requirement of near certainty in Israel.228
However, in practice, implementation of the test of near
certainty in Israel has led to a similar result as that achieved in the
United States. Moreover, in my opinion, in times of crisis and
emergency, the extent of the protection given to freedom of
expression in Israel is significantly greater than the extent of the
protection given to freedom of expression in the United States, as
we have seen from the anti-terrorist legislation commencing in
223 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
224 For an extensive discussion of the elements of this test, see P. Lahav, "On
Freedom of Expression in the Case Law of the Supreme Court," 7 MISHPATIM 375
(1977) (author's translation).
225 H.C. 73/53 "Kol-Ha'am" et al. v. Minister of the Interior, 7 P.D. 871, 891-92
(author's translation).
226 Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
227 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
228 A. Barak, "The Tradition of Freedom of Expression in Israel and its Problems,"
27 MISHPATIM 223, 232-33 (1997) (author's translation).
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1996.
In Israel, the status of freedom of expression as a "supra-
right," the "essence of democracy," did not transform it into an
absolute right.2 9 Like all constitutional rights, it is relative. The
scope of the protection given to freedom of expression is
undoubtedly much broader than the scope of the protection given
to freedom of expression in the United States following the
terrorist attack of September 11, 2001.
The guidelines for limiting expression are determined in
accordance with the relative social importance of values and
principles. These principles often clash with the freedom of
expression. In the clash between freedom of expression and the
values of society as a whole, such as the maintenance of public
peace and safety, freedom of expression is still given priority over
national security. Israel is repeatedly subjected to terrorist attacks,
and the dangers and likelihood of terrorist attacks have risen,
leading to the great importance of national security to society.
Giving priority to freedom of expression requires very
comprehensive protection. Thus, for example, it has been held that
freedom of expression also includes opinions which are
dangerous, irritating, and racist.23 The only harm which may be
considered is harm which is real, material, severe, and dangerous,
bearing in mind the likelihood of it occurring. 3'
The case which most clearly illustrates Israel's fight against
terrorism with "one arm tied behind its back" 32 and its obstinate
refusal to let the hysteria resulting from terrorist attacks and the
phrase "national security" infringe upon the democratic values
cherished by Israel, is the Jabarin case. 33 Notwithstanding that the
judgment was given after the eruption of the Intifada of 2000,234
i.e., in circumstances where the fear for national security and
229 Cr./Ap. 255/68 State of Israel v. Ben Moshe, 22(2) P.D. 427, 435 (author's
translation).
230 H.C. 399/85 Kahana et al v. Managing Committee of the Broadcasting Authority
et al, 41(3) P.D. 255, 281 (author's translation).
231 Id .
232 HC 5100/94 The Public Committee against Torture in Israel et al v. The
Government of Israel et al, 53(4) P.D. 817, 842 (author's translation).
233 Cr. F.H. 8613/96 Jabarin v. State of Israel, 54(5) P.D. 193 (author's translation).
234 The decision in the Further Hearing discussed here, was delivered on November
11, 2000. The lntifada erupted more than a month prior to the decision. Id.
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public safety was high, the scope of the protection afforded by
Israel to freedom of expression was not compromised.235
The only law in Israel that is entitled "prevention of terrorism"
is the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance - 1948 (Ordinance). 236
The judgment in Jabarin deals with the interpretation that should
be given to Section 4(a) of the Ordinance, which provides as
follows: I
A person who - (a) publishes, in writing or orally, words of
praise, sympathy or encouragement for acts of violence
calculated to cause death or injury to a person or for threats of
such acts of violence ... shall be guilty of an offense and shall
be liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding
three years or to a fine not exceeding one thousand pounds or to
both such penalties.237
Mr. Jabarin was a journalist from Um-al-Fahem who published
an article expressing support and encouragement for private
persons throwing stones and Molotov cocktails.23 8 There is no
doubt that throwing stones and Molotov cocktails are acts of
violence that may endanger human life; however, because the
balance that was required in this case was among freedom of
expression, national security, and public safety, the majority
opinion tended towards an interpretation which gave protection to
freedom of expression and removed Jabarin's article from the
scope of the offense under Section 4 of the Ordinance.239
The majority opinion held that the Ordinance had been enacted
235 Id.
236 The Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, No. 33- (1948),
http://www~mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH07tuO [hereinafter the Ordinance] (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
237 Id. at § 4.
238 Following is a passage from the article as cited in the judgment:
The full truth - I tell you, my friends, that every time I said 'Ahoy' and threw a
stone, I was overcome with the feeling that victory was calling to us: 'continue
to throw, be more patient, contribute and be more stubborn, and I shall be the
dawn that you have awaited so long.' I shall not deny, my friends, that every
time I shout 'Ahoy' and throw a Molotov Cocktail, I feel that I am wrapped in
splendor and glory, I feel that I have found my identity and that I am taking part
in the defense of this identity; that I am a man fit to live a life of dignity. This
feeling gives me a sense of being uplifted.
Cr. F.H. 8613/96 Jabarin v. State of Israel, 54(5) P.D. 193 (author's translation).
239 Id. (author's translation).
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in order to fight against terrorist organizations, and a terrorist
organization is defined in the Ordinance as a group of people and
not as individuals. 24 ° The Ordinance, therefore, only applies to
situations in which terrorist organizations are involved.241 It does
not apply to violent activities of any type which have no
connection to such organizations.242 The Ordinance is concerned
only with organized terror and not with acts of violence performed
by individuals. 43 The fact that the Ordinance severely infringes
freedom of expression caused the majority opinion to confine the
construction of section 4 to inciting a terrorist organization to
commit a violent act.244 Notwithstanding that section 4(a) of the
Ordinance itself does not attribute the praise, encouragement, and
support for acts of violence to acts committed only by terrorist
organizations, the majority opinion still refused to regard the
prohibition set out in section 4(a) of the Ordinance as something
derived from the nature of the violent activity. 24 The majority
refused to hold that the prohibition to publish is derived from the
terrorist nature of the violent activity and not from its attribution to
a terrorist organization, that the prohibition applies also to the
publication of praise, encouragement, and support for acts of
violence, even if these acts are performed by individuals, or
members of a group, who are not identified as members of a
terrorist organization.246
Despite the dangers arising from Jabarin's published article
encouraging acts of violence such as throwing stones and Molotov
cocktails, the article did not contain any statements intended to
praise the acts of violence of terrorist organizations. This fact
meant that the article could not be said to support a terrorist
organization, and therefore section 4(a) of the Ordinance was not
applicable to it.
240 Supra note 236. Section 1 of the Ordinance defines a terrorist organization as "a
body of persons resorting in its activities to acts of violence calculated to cause death or
injury to a person or to threats of such acts of violence." Id. (author's translation).
241 Cr. F.H. 8613/96 Jabarin v. State of Israel, 54(5) P.D. 193 (author's translation).
242 Id. (author's translation).
243 Id. at 207 (author's translation).
244 Id. at 203-04 (author's translation).
245 Cr. F.H. 8613/96 Jabarin v. State of Israel, 54(5) P.D. 193 (author's translation).
246 Id. (author's translation).
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This judgment was given at a time when events showed that
the threats posed by individuals were no less real and concrete
than the threats posed by organized groups. Could a similar
outcome be achieved in the United States where the threat posed
by individuals was clearly manifested in the events of September
11, 2001? There can be no doubt that the answer to this is in the
negative.
I would like to mention here that it is not my desire to justify
the judgment in Jabarin. I merely wish to point out that Israel has
been struck by terrorism for longer and more frequently than the
United States. But, in contrast to the United States, Israel has not
become hysterical and has not turned to constitutional measures
available to it, in turn severely harming human rights. On the
contrary, Israel continues to respect these rights in the knowledge
that democracy is only truly tested in times of crisis and
emergency.
I tend to concur with the minority opinion in the Jabarin
case. 247 This is a middle approach which takes the path between
the majority view in the judgment, which confers, in my view,
overly broad protection upon freedom of expression, and the
severe harm caused by the AEDPA and the Patriot Act to this
freedom. The two extreme positions on either side of the middle
way are polar opposites reacting to a similar reality in different
geographical areas, a security situation made shaky by terrorist
attacks.
The changed situation of terrorism in Israel, where the
anticipated threat no longer comes only from terrorist
organizations but also from individual terrorists, must form the
basis for the construction of section 4(a) of the Ordinance. More
precisely, in contrast to the position currently accepted in the
United States, I do not believe that the prohibition should be
expanded to embrace encouraging all acts of violence which may
lead to the death of a person.248 At the same time, in my opinion,
the prohibition should not be restricted in such a way as to apply
only to the encouragement of acts of violence of a terrorist
organization as such. The proper construction, in my' view, is that
which includes within the prohibition of publications which
247 See id. (author's translation).
248 Id. (author's translation).
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encourage acts of violence of the type which is characteristic of
terrorist activities, an interpretation which the Supreme Court of
Israel accepted in the past in the Rabbi Elba case.249
The law must be given a modem construction that is
compatible with changing circumstances.2 In the past, the focus
was on the activities of terrorist organizations, whereas today: "the
phenomenon of terrorism has ceased being solely the product of
the activities of the terrorist organizations, and the share of
individuals, who imitate the members of the organizations but act
on their own, has reached significant proportions., 25'
The dangers inherent to terrorist acts performed by individuals
who do not act on behalf of an organization are no less severe than
the dangers ensuing from the activities of terrorist organizations.
Accordingly, a prohibition must be imposed on encouraging
publications which offer the individual terrorist the support
necessary in order to carry out terrorist acts.
"The purpose of the prohibition is to prevent the existence of
activities of a terrorist nature, whatever the identity of the person
who carries it out."252 The fact that the outcome of the Jabarin
judgment is dangerous for national security and public safety, and
an outcome which is likely to leave the prosecution without tools
for dealing with the phenomenon of incitement to violence, gave
rise to the need to enact a law for the prevention of incitement to
violence. Immediately after the delivery of the judgment in the
Jabarin case, the Israeli government proposed to amend the Penal
Law 253 in such a manner that the offense of incitement to racism
would be changed to the offense of incitement to violence and
racism.254 The proposal suggests applying the test of "objective
249 Cr./Ap 2831/95 Rabbi Ido Elba v. State of Israel, 50(5) P.D. 221 (author's
translation).
250 Aharon Barak, Interpretation of Law, 2 STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 264 (1993)
(author's translation).
251 Jabarin, 54(5) P.D. 193 at 215 (author's translation).
252 Id.
253 Draft Bill amending the Penal Law, no. 58 (1999) [hereinafter Draft Bill].
254 Id. The proposal is as follows: Adding Section 144 D 2: Incitement to violence,
Section 144 D 2(a): A person who does one of the following shall be liable to a term of 5
years imprisonment (1) publishes a call for an act of violence; (2) publishes a statement
which may incite to violence, including praise, support or encouragement for an act of
violence. Id. (author's translation).
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dangerousness" to the expression, to refrain from a probability test
(also known as a near certainty test), and to examine the
dangerousness of the particular publication on the basis of its
content and the circumstances in which it was published. This
proposal has not yet been adopted.
2. The Right to Privacy: The possibility of monitoring
where there is a danger to national security
In Israel, the right to privacy is entrenched in two normative
provisions. The first, section 7 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and
Freedom, has a supra-legal constitutional status.255 Section 7(d)
states that there shall be no violation of the confidentiality of
conversation, or of the writings or records of a person." 6 The
second provision in the Protection of Privacy Law - 1981 has an
ordinary legal status.257 Section 2(2) defines eavesdropping which
is not authorized by statute as a violation of privacy. 8 Contrary to
the United States, which has as an integral part of its anti-terrorist
legislation provisions authorizing, security agencies to monitor
communications between persons, and thereby violate their
privacy; Israel enacted a separate law in 1979 directed primarily at
255 See IsR. CONST. (Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom, 1999), supra note
222.
256 Id. at § 7 (d).
257 The Protection of Privacy Law, 1981, 35 L.S.I. 136 (1980-81).
258 Id. at §2. Section 2 of the Protection of Privacy Law- 1981 provides:
Infringement of privacy is any of the following: (1) spying* or trailing a person
in a manner likely to harass him, or any other harassnent; (2) listening-in
prohibited under any law; (3) photographing a person while he is in the private
domain; (4) publishing a person's photograph under such circumstances that the
publication is likely to humiliate him or bring him into contempt; (5) copying or
using, without permission from the addressee or writer, the contents of a letter
or any other writing not intended for publication, unless the writing is of
historical value or fifteen years have passed since the time of writing; (6) using
a person's name, appellation, picture or voice for profit; (7) infringing a duty of
secrecy laid down by law in respect of a person's private affairs; (8) infringing a
duty of secrecy laid down by law in respect of a person's private affairs; (9)
using, or passing on to another, information on a person's private affairs
otherwise than for the purpose for which it was given; (10) publishing or
passing on anything obtained by way of an infringement of privacy under
paragraphs (1) to (7) or (9); (11) publishing any matter relating to a person's
intimate life, state of health or conduct in the private domain..
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secret monitoring.259 Chapter 2 of the Secret Monitoring Law deals
with secret monitoring for purposes of State security. Under this
law, unlike the situation in the United States in relation to
monitoring for purposes of security, there is no need for a court
order and it suffices to obtain authorization from the Prime
Minister or Minister of Defense and supervision by the Attorney
General.26 The permit to monitor must be specific and in
writing.26' In other words, it is necessary to indicate the identity of
the person whose conversations may be monitored, the place and
type of such conversations, and the period of validity of the
permit, which must not exceed three months. In urgent cases, there
is no need for a permit from the Minister of Defense or Prime
Minister.262 The head of a security authority, such as the
Intelligence Branch of the IDF or the General Secret Service, may,
in cases where they are satisfied that State security requires secret
monitoring to be carried out without delay and that it is not
possible to obtain a permit in time, authorize such monitoring
themselves for a period not exceeding forty-eight hours. They
must also notify the Minister of Defense or Prime Minister to such
effect, and the Minister may cancel or amend the permit.
The purpose of this law is to draw a balance between the
violation of the right of the individual ensuing from permits given
under the law, and legitimate considerations of society such as
security, which justify infringing the privacy of the individual. The
absence of a requirement for a judicial order, which enables the
privacy of an individual to be invaded without the decision of a
neutral and independent judicial body is a defect which can be
rectified. So long as it is clear to the decision-makers that the
balance which they are required to draw requires them to exercise
particular caution so as not to exercise their powers except in cases
of real need, and that they must attempt to limit the scope of the
permit in so far as possible, the fear that the privacy of an
individual will be unnecessarily infringed is significantly reduced.
In particular, it is reduced compared to the acute fear in the case of
American citizens that their privacy will be unnecessarily
259 The Secret Monitoring Law, 1979, 33 L.S.I. 141 (1978-79).
260 Id. at § 4.
261 Id.
262 Id. at § 5 (a).
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infringed, despite the judicial warrant, by reason of the absence of
a requirement to prove a real need for the monitoring in order to
obtain the warrant.
Indeed, the measures provided by the law to the security
authorities are not free from criticism. Despite the fact that the
law was enacted prior to Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom
and accordingly cannot be nullified,263 it is likely that if the law
were to be examined on a constitutional level, the Israeli Supreme
Court would hold that it would have to be constricted in the
manner suggested here, namely, that the powers should not be
exercised except in cases of real necessity. 264
3. Monitoring communications between suspect and
attorney and preventing meetings between suspect
and attorney
A decision issued by the U.S. Attorney General enables the
monitoring of communications between an attorney and his client
and severely infringes on the privilege that applies to such
communications.65 Israel first considered the possibility of an
attorney's involvement in an offense endangering State security in
1979.266 A conversation between an attorney and his client is a
privileged communication 67 and may be monitored only with the
permission of a judge.268 In urgent cases, the head of a security
authority 69 may issue such a permit and immediately thereafter
notify the Minister of Defense of the same in writing. The
Attorney General may cancel the permit.27 °
263 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom, supra note 178, § 10, at 11 (stating
that "[t]hls Basic Law shall not affect the validity of any law in force prior to the
commencement of this Basic Law").
264 See Cr. F/H 2316/95 Gneimat v. State of Israel, 49(4) P.D. 589, 653 (regarding
the possibility of an infringement by a law falling within the "Validity of Laws"
provisions) (author's translation).
265 See supra notes 54-63 and accompanying text.
266 See generally Secret Monitoring Law, 1979, 33 L.S.I. 141 (1978-1979).
267 Evidence Ordinance (New Version) § 48, 1971, 2 L.S.I. 198, 209 (1968-1972).
268 Secret Monitoring Law, supra note 259, § 6(a), at 143.
269 The head of a security authority refers to the General Security Service or the
General Staff of the Israel Defence Forces. Id. § 1, at 141.
270 Id. § 5(a)-(b), at 142-43.
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The privilege between an attorney and his client applies to
conversations for the purpose of proper legal services given to the
client but does not apply to statements made in order to further an
improper purpose, such as the commission of a crime.271 However,
the Supreme Court of Israel does not permit the installation of
recording equipment nor the monitoring of the offices of lawyers,
even where there is evidence to suspect that illegal activities are
being conducted within the office. The reason for this rule is the
impracticability of separating privileged statements from non-
privileged statements. 272
The infringement of the right to proper representation in Israel
is more far reaching than in the United States. In Israel, the law
permits a meeting between an attorney and a detainee suspected of
a security offense to be postponed for up to twenty-one days,273
even though the right to meet one's attorney is a basic right, which
is derived from the right of an individual to personal liberty.274
As. a rule, a detainee is allowed to meet with his attorney
without delay;275 however, in relation to security offenses, the
exception which allows the postponement of the meeting on
grounds relating to the good of the investigation is broadened. 276
In the circumstances set out in the law relating to the subversion of
the investigation or public safety,277 the person responsible for the
meeting has the power to postpone it for ten days without court
authorization.278 In order to extend this period, the person
responsible must apply to the President of the District Court, and
the latter is entitled to extend the period so that the cumulative
271 Cr./Ap. 670/80 Abuhazeira v. State of Israel, 75(3) P.D. 681, 692 (author's
translation).
272 Appeal under Secret Monitoring Law 1/81 State of Israel v. Anon, 76(1) P.D.
614, 615-616 (author's translation). See A. Stein, Eavesdropping and Secret Electronic
Monitoring, 14. MISHPATIM 527, 547-48 (1985) (author's translation).
273 See Criminal Procedure (Enforcement Powers - Arrests 1996), § 35 (author's
translation).
274 H.C. 3412/91 Sufian v. Commander of IDF Forces in the Gaza Strip, 47(2) P.D.
843 (author's translation).
275 Criminal Procedure (Enforcement Powers - Arrests 1996), § 34(b) (author's
translation).
276 Id. at § 34(d) (author's translation).
277. Id. at § 35(a) (author's translation).
278 Id. (author's translation).
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period does not exceed twenty-one days.279
If the meeting is postponed, notification of the delay must be
given to the detainee. The detainee is entitled to appeal first to the
District Court and thereafter to the Supreme Court.28
0
An additional provision which infringes on the rights of the
detainee is the provision Which enables delay of notification to
relatives or a lawyer that a person suspected of security offenses
has been detained.28' Notification may be delayed upon
authorization by a judge of the District Court if he is satisfied that
the good of the investigation requires the secret detention.282 The
delay is for a period of forty-eight hours and may be extended for
up to fifteen days.28 3
The violation of the rights of a person detained for security
offenses is a severe violation, but one that satisfies the conditions
of the limitation clause. The violation is compatible with the
values of the State of Israel as a democratic State. However, it is
wrong "for human rights to become a tool to negate State and
public safety. 284 When a democracy is under a threat that security
offenses will be committed against its citizens and against the
State as a whole, the State must protect itself against this threat.
The purpose of the violation is proper because the protection of
public safety and State security is what drives the provisions
infringing the rights of the detainee. The measure is also
proportional - there is a rational connection between the measure
and the purpose. The purpose is, to foil -the subversion of
investigative proceedings or defend human life, and the measure
may only be applied where there are grounds for suspecting that if
the meeting is not prevented or the notification not made, such
subversion will take place. The measure is the least drastic one
available. The law confines the nature of the offenses and the
period of time in which the measures are taken and enables the
court to scrutinize that need. The benefit arising from the violation
279 Id. at § 35(d) (author's translation).
280 Id. at § 35(e) (author's translation).
281 Id. at § 36 (author's translation).
282 Id. (author's translation).
283 Id. (author's translation).
284 F Cr./H 7048/97 Anon. v. Minister of Defense, 54(1) P.D. 721, 743 (author's
translation).
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exceeds the damage caused by it. The right of the detainee to meet
with his attorney is not eliminated completely but is kept in
abeyance for a maximum period of twenty-one days.285 At the end
of this period, the detainee will be allowed to meet with his
attorney and obtain representation. Despite the severe injury to the
rights of the suspect, the injury is proportional in light of the
benefits to the investigation which is likely to expose the terrorist
partners of the detainee or prevent harm to human life. This
benefit undoubtedly exceeds the damage described above.
4. The Right to Privacy: Liberty Not to Be Searched
The rule in Israel is that a warrant is required in order to
conduct a search. 286 The judge has discretion whether or not to
issue the warrant and will issue it only in accordance with the
criteria set out in the law.287 The law is satisfied with grounds for
belief and does not require reasonable grounds.288 This fact may
lead to the conclusion that in Israel, like in the United States, the
discretion exercised by the judge is not substantive but purely
technical.
The search warrant must be detailed and describe the articles
285 It should be noted that the need to satisfy the test of proportionality is
strengthened in view of the Criminal Procedure (Enforcement Powers - Arrests) (Delay
of Meeting Between a Security Detainee and his Attorney - Regulations - 1997)
(author's translation). Initially it is possible to delay the meeting for six days only,
thereafter only a "person in charge" as defined in the Regulations may delay it for an
additional four days. See id. at para. 2 (author's translation).
286 Criminal Procedure (Arrest and Searches) Ordinance (New Version) § 23, 1969,
2 L.S.I. 30, 35 (1968-1972) [hereinafter Criminal Procedure Ordinance].
287 Id. § 23 provides:
A Judge may issue a warrant to search any house or place, if - (1) a search of
the house or place is necessary to secure the production of any article for the
purpose of any investigation, trial or other proceeding; (2) the Judge has reason
to believe that the house or place is used for the deposit or sale of a stolen
article, or that there is kept or deposited therein any article by means of or in
respect of which an offense has been committed or which has been used, or is
intended to be used, for any illegal purpose; (3) the Judge has reason to believe
that a person is confined in the house or place in such circumstances that the
confinement constitutes an offence.
Id.
288 Id
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which the warrant states may be seized. 289 However, if the person
conducting the search finds an article which is not mentioned on
the warrant and has reasonable grounds for believing that an
offense has been committed or is about to be committed in respect
of it, he is entitled to seize the article and bring it before the judge
who issued the warrant in order for the latter to decide, as he sees
fit, what should be done with the article.290 In the United States
under the Patriot Act, the warrant may be general, and so there is
no need to bring before the judge any articles that have been
seized but are not mentioned in the warrant.291
In Israel, it is also possible to conduct searches without a
search warrant. A warrant is not needed in defined cases where a
police officer has grounds to believe that a crime is underway,
recently committed therein, or that a person in the place is seeking
the help of the police and there are grounds for believing an
offense is being committed, the occupier thereof calls the police
for assistance or the police officer is pursuing a person escaping
from the legal custody or evading arrest.
292
Whether the search is being conducted under a warrant or not,
the search must be conducted before two witnesses who are not
police officers, unless a judge permits the search to be conducted
without witnesses, the occupant of the house himself requests a
search without witnesses, or the circumstances and urgency of the
case do not allow a search before two witnesses.29 3
In the case of security offenses concerning the transfer of
information to an enemy or espionage, where the security of the
State requires immediate action, a senior police officer or
Inspector-General of Police may give a written permit to search in
relation to that offense. This permit is a substitute for a judicial
warrant and is subject to the condition that he is retroactively
authorized by a judge within three days of the day of the permit.294
289 Id. § 24(b) at 35-36.
290 Id.
291 See supra notes 21-44 and accompanying text.
292 Criminal Procedure Ordinance, supra note 286, § 25, at 36.
293 Id. at § 24(b).
294 Penal Law § 126, 1977, Special Volume L.S.I. 1, 43 (1977). Most recently,
Israel empowered the GSS to conduct searches in private places without the knowledge
of the owner if security needs justify the search. In such cases there is no need for a
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A military commander of the rank of major and above in
considering offenses of espionage, transferring information to the
enemy, and entering into a military area, may issue a written order
for a soldier to conduct a search of the body or belongings of a
person, when there is no possibility of a police officer doing so,
and he is of the opinion that national security requires immediate
action. No searches under this power may be conducted within the
home of a person, and this permit also must be retroactively
authorized by a judge within three days.295
Many other laws deal with the conduct of searches
empowering persons who are not police officers to search the
property or body of a person. For example, the. captain of an
aircraft who has reasonable grounds for believing that a person is
about to perform a dangerous act or is likely to endanger the safety
of the aircraft or passengers in it, may take reasonable safety
measures including searching the aircraft or passengers. 96 Prior to
warrant. See GSS Act, § 10 (2002) (author's translation).
295 Penal Law of 1977, § 127.
296 Section 4 of the Air Navigation (Offenses and Jurisdiction) Law of 1971
provides a commander the power to take safety measures:
(a) if the commander of an aircraft has reasonable grounds to believe that a
person has committed, or is about to commit, on board an aircraft an act which
may or does jeopardise the safety of the aircraft or of persons or property
therein or good order or discipline on board, he may take such reasonable safety
measures, including restraint and search, as in his opinion are necessary to
protect the safety of the aircraft or of the persons or property therein or to
maintain good order or discipline on board or to enable him to disembark such
person in accordance with Section 8 or 9. (b) The power vested in the
commander of an aircraft by subsection (a) shall also be exercisable if he has
reasonable grounds to believe that a person has committed, or is about to
commit, on board the aircraft an act which in the opinion of the commander is
an offense under any law existing in the state of registration.
Air Navigation (Offenses and Jurisdiction) Law § 4, 25 L.S.I. 55, 57 (1970-1971). See
also The Implementation of the Interim Agreement Concerning the West Bank and Gaza
Strip (Jurisdictional Powers and Other Provisions), § 11 (1996) (author's translation),
which confers powers of search upon an "examiner:"
(b) An examiner is entitled, for the maintenance of public safety and in order to
uncover offenses, to conduct a search in the property or vehicle of a person who
enters Israel from an area or departs Israel for an area. (c) A police officer, or an
examiner who has been granted the powers of a police officer in accordance
with Section 4 of the Ordinance, and also an examiner who is under their
supervision at the check point, are entitled for the maintenance of public safety
and in order to uncover offenses, to conduct a search, as provided in Section 22
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boarding an aircraft and prior to entering an airport, security
officers have power to conduct searches of the property and body
of a person. The search may take place despite the refusal of the
person, and that person may be prevented from entering or leaving
the airport or aircraft.297
In 1996, Israel enacted a special law regulating the conditions
of the Ordinance, on the body of a person who enters Israel from an area or
departs Israel for an area; a search on the body of a person shall only be
conducted by a person of the same gender. (d) Where a person has refused to
meet the demands of an examiner under subsection (a) or to the conduct of a
search under subsections (b) or (c), the examiner is entitled to prevent that
person from passing through the check point. (e) The powers of a police officer
for the purpose of seizing property revealed in consequence of a search under
this part, shall also be available to a soldier who has been granted the powers of
police officer under Section 4 of the Ordinance and the provisions of Part 4 of
the Ordinance shall apply to the article seized, with the appropriate changes.
297 The Air Navigation (Safety of Civil Aviation) Law, Part 3 § 9, 1997 (author's
translation) provides:
(a) All those listed in Section 10 are entitled to conduct a search - (1) on the
body of a person as provided in Section 22 of the Criminal Procedure (Arrest
and Searches) Ordinance [New Version] - 1969 or in a vehicle in consequence
of the person or vehicle entering the airport, the landing area or aviation facility
or in consequence of them staying there; (2) on the body of a person as provided
in Section 22 of the Criminal Procedure (Arrest and Searches) Ordinance [New
Version] - 1969 prior to boarding an aircraft, in consequence of his staying in
an aircraft or soon after disembarking therefrom; (c) in other cargo and goods
prior to being brought into the airport, the landing area or aviation facility, prior
to being put on board an aircraft, soon after being disembarked from an aircraft,
or in consequence of being located in all these; (3) in an aircraft in consequence
of its entry into the airport, the landing area or while it is located there - if the
search is required, in his opinion, in order to preserve the public safety or if he
suspects that the person is unlawfully carrying a weapon or explosives or that in
the vehicle, aircraft, the cargo or other goods weapons or explosives are present
unlawfully. (b) All those listed in Section 10 are entitled to ask of a person
located in an airport, the landing area or aviation facility to identify himself. (c)
Where a person has refused to have a search conducted on his body, in the cargo
or other goods in the circumstances set out in subsection (a) by a competent
person, or has refused to identify himself as provided in subsection (b), the
person authorized to conduct the search or demand the identification, without
derogating from his authority to conduct the search despite the refusal, is
entitled - (1) to prevent that person from entering the airport, the landing area,
the aviation facility or aircraft or his departure from these places, or the entry of
the cargo or other goods to them or their removal from them, as appropriate; 10.
The persons entitled to conduct a search (a) those entitled to conduct a search as
provided in Section 9: (1) a security official; (2) a police officer; (3) a soldier;
(4) a member of the Civil Defense Force.
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for searching the body of a suspect.2 98 No search of the body of a
person may be conducted save in accordance with this law. The
law requires the consent of the suspect prior to the search being
carried out. In the absence of consent from the suspect to the
search, written authorization must be obtained for the search from
a police officer. The law is aware of the fact that the search
infringes upon the dignity and privacy of an individual and
therefore prohibits the conduct of a search in public unless there is
a near certainty of danger to the public.299 Internal searches (i.e.,
blood tests or gynecological tests) to which the suspect has not
given his or her consent are subject to the authorization of the
court. Only after the court has heard the suspect and his attorney,
in camera, and is satisfied that all the conditions set out in the law
for the conduct of the search have been met, that there is no other
way which is less injurious to obtain the evidence, and that the
need to obtain the evidence is greater than the harm to the suspect,
will the court grant an order permitting an internal search.3 °°
Prior to the enactment of this law, a general provision in the
law authorized the carrying out of a search of the body or
belongings of a person under arrest.0 1 The courts interpreted this
provision as subject to the right of a person per se to dignity and
privacy, and held that even if the person being searched had given
his consent,
this still does not mean that everything is allowed. The fact that
reference is to basic rights, a violation of human dignity and
privacy, necessitates, even when the search is consented to, to
298 Criminal Procedure (Enforcement Powers - Searches on the Body of a Suspect)
Law, 1996 (author's translation).
299 See id at § 3(e) (author's translation).
300 See id at § 8 (author's translation).
301 Section 22 of the Criminal Procedure (Arrest and Searches) Ordinance (New
Version) of 1969 was amended by the Criminal Procedure (Enforcement Powers -
Searches on the Body of a Suspect) Law, 1996 (author's translation). Section 22 of the
Criminal Procedure (Arrest and Searches) Ordinance (New Version) of 1969 provided:
[A] police officer who has arrested a person, with or without a warrant, or has
received an arrested person from the person who arrested him may search or
cause to be searched the effects of the arrested person, and that person, and
place into safe custody everything found with him.
Criminal Procedure (Arrest andSearches) Ordinance (New Version) § 24(b), 1969, 2
L.S.I. New Version 30, 36 (1972).
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preserve a reasonable level of fairness in order not to degrade
the person in whose body the search is conducted, and his
privacy, when this is not required and is not vital for the purpose
of the search.3 °2
In circumstances where there is no consent and the search
leads to humiliation and shame, it has been held that:
this humiliation and shame are only permitted when they are
intended for a proper purpose, when there is a suspicion of a
crime which must be prevented or uncovered, and it must not
exceed what is necessary: all in accordance with the
circumstances of each case - such as the purpose of conducting
this search, the nature of the, offense of which he is suspected,
the existence of an emergency, the justification for conducting
the search, the manner of the search, the place of the search and
the like. 303
5. Secret Evidence:
In Britain, it is possible to make use of secret evidence in order
to convict a terrorist. This is also the case in the United States
under the Presidential Order concerning the trial of terrorists in
military tribunals. In Israel, secret evidence is prohibited: secret
evidence may not be adduced ex parte - in the absence of the
accused. Evidence which is brought before the court cannot be
secret and therefore, as we shall see, when it desires to conceal
evidence, the authorities turn to administrative detention as the
solution.
6. Administrative Detention - Preventive Detention:
The Patriot Act enables the detention of aliens for up to seven
days without bringing them before a judge. The Attorney General
has power to extend this period for additional periods of six
months, without limitation in practice. This power bears the
characteristics of an administrative detention.30 4 It is a detention in
302 C.A. 2145/92, State of Israel v. Guetta, 46(5) P.D. 278, 289 (author's
translation).
303 Id. (author's translation).
304 For an extensive discussion of administrative detentions, see Emanuel Gross,
Human Rights, Terrorism, and the Problem of Administrative Detention in Israel: Does
a Democracy Have the Right to Hold Terrorists as Bargaining Chips?, 18 ARIZ. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 721 (2002).
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which a person is held without trial for the purpose of preventing
him from committing future offenses, and there is no time
restriction on such detention."' In Israel, the Emergency Powers
(Detention) Law - 1979306 granted the Minister of Defense a
similar, although not identical, power to that of the Attorney
General granted by the Patriot Act. As -previously explained, Israel
has been the subject of terrorist attacks since its establishment.3 7
In times of emergency, the law gives the Minister of Defense
power to issue a detention order if he has reasonable grounds for
believing that reasons of national security or public safety require
the same.30 ' The period of validity of the detention order may not
exceed six months, but the Minister may extend the order from
time to time for additional periods of six months, for reasons of
security.30 9 In my opinion, the significant difference between the
Patriot Act and the Israeli law concerns the issue of judicial
review. Contrary to the position in the United States where the
power of the Attorney General is not subject to judicial review, the
power of the Minister of Defense in Israel is subject to routine
scrutiny. First, a person arrested under this law must be brought
before a judge within forty-eight hours of the day of his
detention.310 If a judge authorized the detention, the law requires
the President of the District Court to reconsider the matter of the
detention every three months. Moreover, the law enables a
detainee to appeal the decision of the President of the District
Court before the Supreme Court.31 2 No such provision exists in the
Patriot Act.
It should be noted that today, contrary to the practice in the
past, the Israeli Supreme Court tends to intervene more in security
305 Ruth Gavison & Miriam Gur-Aryeh, Administrative Detention, 3 CIVILIAN
RIGHTS 1, 4 (1982) (author's translation).
306 Emergency Powers (Detention) Law, 1979, 33 L.S.I. 89 (1978-1979).
307 According to Sections 49-50 of Basic Law: The Government, the declaration of
the state of emergency must be renewed every year. ISR. CONST. (Basic Law: The
Government, 1999) §§ 49, 50.
308 Emergency Powers (Detention) Law of 1979, § 2(a).
309 Id. at § 2(b).
310 Id. at § 4(a).
311 1d. at § 5.
312 Id. at § 7.
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decisions and in the content of decisions relating to administrative
detentions. 3 A clear example of this tendency may be seen in the
decision given in April 2000 concerning Lebanese detainees,
where it was decided that the State of Israel could not hold the
Lebanese petitioners in administrative detention, in accordance
with the Emergency Powers Law, since they were being held as
bargaining tools for the release of the Israeli navigator Ron Arad,
and they themselves posed no real danger to national or public
safety.3
14
Notwithstanding the criticism directed at administrative
detentions carried out in Israel, I believe that the fact that, in
Israel, no steps are taken to prevent the judicial review of the
detention of a person, even in times of emergency, allows Israel to
pass the test of democracy in times of crisis with greater success
than the United States. Following the judgment in the case of the
Lebanese detainees, legislative initiatives were adopted which will
allow the detention of members of enemy forces who are not
prisoners of war." 5 The law will embrace all those who do not fall
within the paradigms of the various conventions and take part in
enemy actions or belong to the enemy forces.316
313 Admin.Det./Appeal 2/86, Anon. v. Minister of Defense, 51(2) P.D. 508 (author's
translation).
314 Id. (author's translation).
315 Detention of Members of Enemy Forces Who Are Not Entitled to the Status of
Prisoners of War Bill - 2000, Bill No. 2830, published Jun. 14, 2002. In the case of the
Lebanese detainees, it was held that they were not civilians who had been taken as
hostages nor were they lawful combatants under the rules of international law; therefore,
they were not prisoners of war. There was no doubt however that they belonged to the
forces of the enemy; therefore, the title of the proposed law is the detention of members
of enemy forces who are not entitled to the status of prisoners of war. Id. (author's
translation).
316 Draft Bill, supra note 253 at § 2. Defines the phrase, "a member of an enemy
force who is not a prisoner of war," as follows:
a person who is a member of the enemy force or a person who takes
part in the hostile activities of a force as a aforesaid, whether directly
or indirectly, in relation to whom the conditions set out in Sections 1,
2 and 3 of the Schedule to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907
Relative to the Laws and Practices of War on Land or Section 4 of
the Third Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, do not apply and who is therefore not
entitled to the status of a prisoner of war.
Id. (author's translation).
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The proposed law is similar in spirit to the existing Detention
Law in Israel although in addition to the Minister of Defense, it
empowers the Chief of the General Staff to issue an order for the
detention of a person that the Chief of Staff believes to be a
member of an enemy force who is not a prisoner of war. The
period of detention is limited and will cease at the date on which
the Minister of Defense gives notice of the cessation of hostile
activities between the State of Israel and the enemy force with
which the detained person is affiliated.31 7 The proposed law also
suggests restricting the scope of judicial review. It will no longer
be necessary to confirm the order within forty-eight hours, but
only after twenty-one days from the date of the issue of the
order.318 The Chief of Staff shall conduct a routine scrutiny of the
detention every six months and will consider whether there are
humanitarian reasons justifying the release of the detainee. The
decision of the Chief of Staff may be appealed to the District
Court.
3 19
Between the publication of this proposal and the time of
writing this article, no actual bill has been drafted with good
reason. In my opinion, restricting judicial review will cause the
law to be flawed from a constitutional point of view. A period of
twenty-one days without judicial review is not proportional and
will not satisfy the fundamental balancing test, the limitation
clause. Cases may arise in which a person is held in detention, the
most oppressive of the possible violations to his human rights, for
twenty-one days, without cause, until the court rectifies the error.
Israel should not fall into the trap for democracy set by
317 Section 3 of the Bill provides:
(a) Where the Chief of the General Staff has grounds to believe that a person
held by the authorities is a member of the enemy forces who is not a prisoner of
war, he may, by order under his hand, direct that such person be detained in a
place to be determined. (b) An order issued under subsection (a) shall be valid
up to the date on which the Minister of Defense shall give notice, by a
certificate signed by him, of the cessation of hostile activities between the State
of Israel and the enemy force with which the detainee is affiliated or in the
activities of which the detainee took part, or up to an earlier date of which he
shall notify the Chief of the General Staff.
Id. (author's translation).
318 Id. at § 4 (author's translation).
319 Id. at § 6 (author's translation).
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emergencies, the trap into which the United States has fallen.
Effective and fair judicial review is not only one of the basic rights
of the legal system, but it is also essential to the preservation of
human rights and liberties.3 2' This is the reason why in Israel, as
opposed to the United States, restricting access to the courts is not
possible even in times of emergency. While the U.S. Constitution
vests the U.S. President with the power to restrict access to the
courts, in the Israeli Basic Law, the Government prohibits such a
measure.
321
Israel is in a constant state of emergency; therefore, it is
appropriate for the broad and dangerous powers held by the
government to promulgate regulations which supersede any law
322
to be balanced by a provision prohibiting the restriction of access
to the courts. However, has not terrorism placed the United States
in a similar constant state of emergency in which the provisions of
the Patriot Act modify earlier legislation and at the same time
significantly restrict access to the courts?
Security is a precondition of existence. This is so in every
State, however enlightened, and the Patriot Act has proven this.
We would have expected that if in the United States the situation
was such as to lead to the grave legislation which was actually
enacted, then, a fortiori, this would be the case in the State of
Israel. The existential danger in Israel is greater and more concrete
than it is in the United States. In Israel, the danger is not only to
the national existence, but also to concrete existence. The
Holocaust which befell the Jewish people demonstrates the
danger. The terrorism which sheds our blood brings it to mind
every day. There is no doubt that national security in Israel, more
320 Avinoam Sharon, Administrative Detention: Boundaries of Power and Scope of
Review, 13 LAW & ARMY 205, 207 (1999) (author's translation).
321 See ISR. CONST. (Basic Law: The Government, 1999) § 50(d) (stating that
"[e]mergency regulations cannot prevent appeal to the Courts, cannot prescribe penalties
retroactively and cannot permit abuses of human dignity.").
322 See ISR. CONST. (Basic Law: The Government, 1999) §50 which states:
(a) During a state of emergency the Government may make emergency
regulations in order to protect the State, public security and vital supplies and
services; emergency regulations shall be submitted to the Knesset Defense and
Foreign Affairs Committee as soon as possible after they were made .... (c)
Emergency regulations can change any Law, temporarily suspend its effect or
set conditions for it, and also to impose or to increase taxes or other obligatory
payments, all as long as there is no contrary provision in the Law.
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so than in other countries, should enjoy a preferential status.3 23
Despite the special conditions of the State of Israel which
could have provided the basis for an extreme approach - tending
to give the security interest absolute preference over other interests
- and for taking a low tone approach towards the need to draw a
balance between them, I have tried to show in the above examples
that Israel is far removed from the path of extremism which is
insensitive to human rights, notwithstanding the burden of an
emergency of the type which descended on the United States
following the attack on September 11, 2001.
V. Is the Response of the United States Appropriate to
Achieve the Goal of National Security?
Human rights are not absolute rights, and it is possible to
infringe them in order to preserve national security and the safety
of the public.3 24 "Democracy need not commit suicide in order to
prove that it exists. 3 25 Moreover, the security of the State, the
nation, and its citizens is an important public interest which stands
at the heart of the basic values of a democratic State. Without the
personal safety of each citizen and without ensuring national
security, it is not possible to guarantee the real implementation of
human rights: "without order there is no liberty. '' 26
There are circumstances in which a balance must be drawn
between human rights and the public interest. In this balance the
superior value of national security may supersede inferior values
such as the liberty of the individual, his right to privacy, and to a
fair trial. However, this superiority will only be brought into the
calculation if the requirements of the balancing formula regarding
the likelihood of harm to the value having preference, and the
extent of the harm thereto, are satisfied.3 27 Thus, for example, in
323 1. Zamir, Human Rights and National Security, 19 MISHPATIM 17, 18 (1989)
(author's translation).
324 See Cr. Applic. 537/95 Gneimat v. State of Israel, 49(3) P.D. 355,417 (author's
translation).
325 Election Appeals [E.A.] 2, 3/84 Neiman v. Chairman of the Central Elections
Committee of the Elections to the Eleventh Knesset, 39(2) P.D. 225, 315 (author's
translation).
326 See H.C. 14/86 Laor v. Film & Theatre Supervisory Board, 41(1) P.D. 421, 433
(author's translation).
327 H.C. 2481/93 Dayan v. Superintendent Yehuda Wilk and 5 others, 48(2) P.D.
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Israel the public interest in security overrides freedom of
movement outside the borders of the State, provided that there is
an honest and serious fear that security would be harmed if the
right to leave the country were to be exercised.328
It is difficult to establish a uniform formula; the formula varies
in accordance with the status of the values and the relationship
between them. However, some formula, test, or balance of
principles must be set which will reflect the general legal norm
and at its core, the constitutional principle which will apply to the
entire class of similar cases.329
The phenomenon of terrorism is not a new one in the United
States. However, its appearance on September 11, 2001 exposed
the extent of the dangers inherent in it and required the United
States to respond to it in a variety of ways. Apart from the military
response, the United States turned to legislation which, on one
hand, breached the previous balances between human rights and
national security, and on the other hand, failed to establish any
new fundamental balancing test between the clashing principles. Is
this response proper?
The answer to this is in the negative. The U.S. Constitution
does not contain any fundamental balancing test; in contrast to
Israel, the U.S. Constitution does not establish any guidelines for a
constitutional examination of the violations of human rights. The
primary danger arising from the absence of a fundamental
balancing test is expressed by the situation that developed in the
United States. At the moment of truth - at the difficult hour of
heightened enmity caused by the wave of terror - the majority of
citizens exerted heavy and influential pressure on the government,
which represents the majority. The government responded by
enacting legislation which infringed human rights and .turned the
exceptions - which in the past could be accepted - into the rule,
and the rule into the exception. The Patriot Act creates an even
more dangerous and difficult result. The absence of a fundamental
balancing test in the U.S. Constitution has led the courts to create
456, 472-73 (author's translation).
328 H.C. 448/85 Adv. Kamal Dahar et al v. Rabbi Itzhak Peretz, 40(2) P.D. 701, 707
(author's translation).
329 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in The Age of Balancing, 96
YALE L. J. 943, 948 (1987).
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tests for violations of human rights and guidelines which
distinguish between the purpose of the norm violating the basic
rights on one hand, and the proportionality of the harm on the
other hand. American case law has developed a doctrine of levels
of scrutiny which is based on the level of importance of the social
values underlying the right.33 The Patriot Act, which denies almost
all judicial review, neutralizes the courts' function of enforcing the
U.S. Constitution, and prevents citizens from properly defending
their rights:
The anti-terrorism legislation recently signed into law by
President Bush appears to only be a means to give law
enforcement officials the necessary tools to find terrorists and
prevent future attacks. But in reality, the USA Patriot Act
continues an alarming trend known as court-stripping-removing
authority from the judiciary in times of crisis.... As it has done
in times of past tragedy, the government responded by passing
legislation that reduces or eliminates the process of judicial
review and erodes our civil liberties. . . . In treating the
judiciary as an inconvenient obstacle to executive action rather
than an essential instrument of accountability, the recently
passed USA Patriot Act builds on the dubious precedent
Congress set five years ago [the AEDPA] when it enacted a
trilogy of laws that, in various ways, deprive federal courts of
their traditional authority to enforce the Constitution of the
United States.
331
Moreover, as the Patriot Act is the product of the outcry of the
majority, and thereby injures the minority, the federal court, whose
function it is to prevent such injury and restrain the tyranny of the
majority, is prevented from fulfilling that task:
As in past times of crisis the minority is the most likely target of
government excess. It is this reality that makes bill's court-
stripping provisions so potentially harmful. The courts exist
specifically to give voice to the minority and were created
because the Framers were well aware of the ease in which an
unpopular group or viewpoint could find itself muzzled and
330 See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
331 American Civil Liberties Union, Terrorism and Civil Liberties: New Anti-
Terrorism Law Continues Dangerous Trend of Stripping Federal Judiciary of Authority
(Nov. 1, 2001), at http://www.aclu.org/news/2001/n110101a.html (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
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persecuted by the majority.332
The danger increases by virtue of the Patriot Act's silence
regarding a fundamental balancing test in relation to infringement
of rights. This silence may lead to the conclusion that the Act is
satisfied with an ad hoc balancing test. An ad hoc balancing test is
a dangerous one which entails paternalistic, fortuitous standards
that cannot be evaluated in advance in terms of their direction and
nature.. 3 In an ad hoc test, it will be possible in the name of State
security to override other values such as individual liberty and
privacy even when the degree of certainty of harm to national
security is low. Is this reasonable?
The extent of the interference and infringement of human
rights must be examined against the interest in the name of which
we infringe the rights. The more important the interest, the more
likely that the infringement will be permitted: "[t]his balancing of
the public's safety needs against the guaranties of individual
liberty dominates our constitutional law cases, with the degree of
the intrusion constantly being weighed against the magnitude of
the state interest that led to the intrusion., 334
State security is an important and significant interest; however,
"security is not a magic word and does not obtain preference in
every case and in all circumstances whatsoever and is not equal at
every level of security and the harm to it. ' 35 Indeed, the
interpretation given by the case law on the U.S. Constitution
positions the Constitution as itself limiting the protection of such
rights as the right to due process in circumstances where there is a
danger to the public.3 6 Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed a
confession of a suspect to be used even though he had not been
informed of all his Miranda rights by reason of the "public safety"
332 American Civil Liberties Union, New Anti-Terrorism Law Once Again
Undermines Role of Judiciary: Statement of Laura W. Murphy, Director ACLU
Washington National Office (Nov. 1, 2001), at http://www.aclu.org/
news/2001/n1 10101c.html (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law
and Commercial Regulation).
333 F.H. 9/77 Israel Electricity Co. Ltd. v. "Ha'aretz" Newspaper, 32(3) P.D. 337,
361 (author's translation).
334 Sievert, supra note 132, 1461.
335 H.C. 4541/94 Alice Miller v. Minister of Defense and 31 others, 49(4) P.D. 94,
122 (author's translation).
336 See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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exception of the Fifth Amendment.337 Likewise, the Court
permitted limitations to be placed on freedom of expression for the
purpose of protecting national security.338  However, these
examples cannot provide a basis for justifying the Patriot Act.
On one hand, the restrictions and harm to constitutional human
rights authorized by the Court prior to the anti-terrorist legislation
are not the same as the restrictions imposed by the Patriot Act. In
the past, it was possible to infringe rights when the danger to
national security and public safety was a real and imminent
danger; these were cases where it was clear that if, for example,
freedom of expression would not be infringed, the national safety
would be harmed immediately.339 The Patriot Act, however,
imposes restrictions in a routine fashion, not only in cases where
the danger is clear and imminent, but also in cases where it is not
clear at all that there is a danger, or there is only a suspicion that
there is a danger. In such cases the level of suspicion as to the
existence of the danger is not high, and there is no knowledge
whatsoever regarding the immediacy of the danger and its extent.
On the other hand, the United States has a difficult history
which testifies to the fact that in times of emergency and crisis,
precisely at the time when democracy is tested, there is a tendency
to violate human rights unnecessarily, a violation which is not
rectified by the courts but which is on occasion actually given
effect, starting with Korematsu340 and ending with the Patriot Act.
In both cases, the connection between the measure taken and the
337 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-58 (1984). In this case, the police had
pursued an armed suspect into a grocery store and found him inside without the weapon.
After the suspect was formally arrested, but before being advised of his Miranda rights, a
police officer asked him where the gun was located. The Court found that the suspect's
answer, and the subsequently discovered weapon, could be admitted as evidence against
the defendant based on a "public safety" exception to the Fifth Amendment protections.
338 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969).
339 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (recognizing that restrictions on
the press are appropriate to prevent, among other things, publication of military positions
during wartime).
340 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944) (declaring that
compulsory exclusion of large groups of citizens from their homes is proper only under
circumstances of "direct emergency and peril" and must be "commensurate with the
threatened danger"). What of the connection between sending these people to internment
camps and the threatened danger? Should the gravity of the threat be sufficient to negate
the need for proof of a connection between the internment and the threat?
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purpose was remote. Korematsu involved a nation in the throes of
hysteria that refused to recognize this and convinced itself that the
connection was a close one, thereby unnecessarily violating
human rights. Perhaps only in hindsight was the nation able to
acknowledge the blindness which had affected it regarding the
absence of a nexus between the cruel measures which it adopted
against citizens who posed no threat whatsoever and the reason for
which these measures were taken. Accordingly, it would have
been right if the Patriot Act would have prevented such mistakes
from being repeated:
The detention of Japanese-Americans in World War II, and the
Vietnam era's unauthorized wiretaps and FBI 'black bag jobs'
should have taught all of us by now: You don't take away our
constitutional liberties in order to defend us from foreign and
domestic enemies who seek to do the same thing.34'
There is no doubt that the threat posed to national security by
terrorist organizations is a real and serious threat, but this threat is
directed concurrently at both the range of democratic values and
the freedoms cherished by the nation. Accordingly, the war waged
by a democratic State against terrorism is difficult, which causes
the State to face an even more difficult task, one with which a
totalitarian State need not contend - the duty to refrain from
infringing democratic values and the freedoms of the individual:
Liberal democracies face a unique challenge in maintaining the
security of the State. Put very simply, that challenge is to secure
democracy against both its internal and external enemies,
without destroying democracy in the process. Authoritarian and
totalitarian States do not have to face this challenge. In such
countries there is no need to ensure that security agencies,
whose techniques inevitably involve a great deal of secrecy, be
accountable to an elected legislature. Nor is there a requirement
in such States that all of their security measures be authorized or
provided for by law and that none of their officials is above the
law. Only liberal democratic States are expected to make sure
that the investigation of subversive activity does not interfere
with the freedoms of political dissent and association which are
essential ingredients of a free society.34 z
341 Steven Kimelmen, Protecting Privilege, NAT. L. J., Dec. 3, 2001, at A21.
342 COMMISSION OF INQUIRY CONCERNING CERTAIN ACTIVITIES OF THE ROYAL
CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE, FREEDOM AND SECURITY UNDER THE LAW, 2nd Rep. Vol. 1,
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The requirement that the government take action against the
phenomenon of terrorism is a legitimate and proper demand. It is
the duty of the government to defend the citizens of the State, but
this must be done in accordance with the democratic values and
not in opposition to them. Accordingly, there are those who
believe that if the government action will infringe democratic
values, it would be better to refrain from acting: "[t]here is a real
legitimate need for protection (of freedoms).... Actions could do
more harm to our society than not taking action.
' 343
Actions should be taken which minimize the violation of
human rights, yet achieve the purpose of the legislation. It seems
that the anti-terrorist legislation of the United States did aim to
minimize the violation of human rights, but instead sought to
protect national security and the lives of American citizens,
whatever the price to democracy.
Lessons may be learned from the history of the United States
in terms of its conduct during times of national emergency, lessons
which the present Congress should have borne in mind when
enacting the Patriot Act, so as not to fail the test yet again.
Anthony Romero, Executive Director of the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU), has explained the two primary lessons
taught by history but which were not absorbed by the government:
First, we know that conscription of opinion often goes hand in
hand with conscription of soldiers. During World War I and
World War II, soldiers were not the only ones conscripted;
public opinion and the First Amendment were also conscripted
as the government attempted to squelch free expression and
dissent.
Sadly, we are finding similar efforts to conscript the First
Amendment in service of "War Against Terrorism." ACLU
offices across the country have begun receiving complaints of
books, magazines, and other materials that are being pulled from
bookstores and libraries because they are viewed as contrary to
or critical of the national interest. In colleges and universities,
we are receiving complaints of efforts to limit academic freedom
and quell dissent and debate. And on October 11, we saw
troubling efforts to conscript public opinion when the White
p.43 (Aug. 1981).
343 UMPanel Eyes Our Loss ofLiberties, MONT. LAWYER, Oct. 2001, at 23.
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House requested that broadcast media outlets edit or decline to
show any video tapes of Osama bin Laden. No evidence of
secret messages or coding was provided in the White House
request, and in any case, the tapes were broadcast worldwide
and were available on-line. Yet, the White House endeavored to
conscript public opinion and information in the name of the
"War Against Terrorism."
The free exchange of ideas, open debate and peaceful dissent are
even more important during periods of national crisis ...
Second, crises tend to encourage gross violations of due process.
Following World War I, strikes in our nation's cities terrified
millions of Americans, who saw law and order collapsing. In
June of 1918, the country was shaken by a series of politically
motivated bombings, including an explosion at the home of
Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer. What ensued was one of
the worst violations of civil liberties in American History.
During raids in November and January, law enforcement
officials swooped down on suspected radicals in thirty-three
cities, arresting 6,000 people, most of them immigrants. The
raids involved wholesale abuses of the law: arrests without a
warrant, unreasonable searches and seizure, wanton destruction
of property, physical brutality, and prolonged detention.
While the initial reaction to the raids was favorable, the tide of
public opinion soon changed. Prominent lawyers like Felix
Frankfurter raised concerns that the abuses "struck at the
foundation of American free institutions, and brought the name
of our country into disrepute."
344
Does the Patriot Act not bring the nation into "disrepute"? The
answer to this is in the affirmative. The Patriot Act returns us to
the past, to cases where the government - the executive authority -
confers upon itself multiple powers which are too numerous for
times of crisis and which may well be regretted by future
generations.
In the past, when the United States infringed the rights of the
individual, the response was later seen to have been an
exaggerated reaction to the frightening situation: "[a]fter the
immediate danger passed, it was recognized that the government
had already possessed ample powers to address the threats at hand;
344 ACLU, supra note 331.
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the new tools were unnecessary at best and dangerous at worst."345
When dealing with the dangers posed by terrorism, it is not
known when the danger will pass, if at all, but national security is
not a magical phrase. It cannot enable us to imprison thousands of
people within the United States, without there being a more than
low-level certainty that these people indeed threaten the security
of the State. Nonetheless, how can the danger posed by terrorism
influence the balance between national security and human rights
from a constitutional point of view? In this connection it is
possible to adopt the constitutional test applied by the State of
Israel known as the limitation clause. The central principle in this
test is the principle of proportionality. 346 The threat of terrorist
attacks is a threat accompanied by great danger and damage.
Therefore, the condition of harm compatible with the extent of the
threat is a condition, met by the Patriot Act: "[w]hen we are
threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect must be
commensurate with the threatened danger."
347
However, in relation to other conditions, joining this condition,
the Patriot Act fails, for example, in making the measure
compatible with the goal. Following the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, the United States argued that it would have
been possible to prevent the attack had law enforcement, security,
and investigative agencies possessed the necessary tools. Yet, the
outcome of the legislation gives rise to the impression that at the
time of enacting it, Congress did not ask itself the following
question: "How did September 1 1th evade our intelligence
services? What powers do law enforcement agencies now have?
And, how can these existing powers be used more effectively to
combat terrorism? ' 348 Had Congress asked itself these questions,
345 Id.
346 It should be noted, the principle of proportionality is the central principle in the
balancing tests the U.S courts created in order to defend constitutional rights. For
example, in Matthews v. Eldridge 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the Court created a balancing
test which is relevant to the right to due process. But those tests are different from
Israel's limitation clause. In Israel, the balancing test is relevant to all the constitutional
rights, but it is created by the legislature. Moreover, the principle of proportionality is
not exclusive. An important principle is whether a proper purpose exists. See infra notes
349-68 and accompanying text.
347 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219-20 (1944).
348 ACLU, supra note 331.
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it is likely that it would have reached a different conclusion to that
reached in the Patriot Act. Why is this so?
. Even before the enactment of the Patriot Act and the 1996 Act,
voices were heard in the FBI to the effect that there was no need
for additional powers to be granted to the FBI in order to fight
terrorists effectively: "[t]he FBI Guidelines already give federal
law-enforcement officials ample authority to monitor and deter
planned criminal activities, including those associated with
terrorism. These guidelines already permit infiltration,
surveillance, and other investigative techniques whenever there is
'a reasonable indication' that criminal or violent activity is being
planned. 349
The FBI has the authority to search and investigate even those
individuals who obey the law, on the basis, of a "reasonable
indication" without need for "probable cause," in what is a serious
violation of the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment.
The explanation for the difference in the level of suspicion
needed in order to launch an investigation and conduct searches is
found in the change which has taken place in the guiding
principles and in the moderation of the threshold conditions by the
Attorney General. On April 5, 1976, then-Attorney General
Edward Levi presented the FBI with two demands which had to be
met:35° (a) no investigation could be conducted solely on the basis
of an unpopular expression where there was no danger of violence;
and (b) the measures available to the FBI in order to undermine
the structures of organizations suspected of terrorism had to be
subject to the First Amendment and, therefore, would not be
implemented in every case:35' "the main thing in my opinion is
that the purpose of the investigation must be the detection of
unlawful conduct and not merely the monitoring of disfavored or
troublesome activities and surely not of unpopular views." '352
349 Thomas C. Martin, The Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995, 20
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 201 (1996).
350 THE ATTY. GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON DOM. SEc. INVESTIGATIONS, reprinted in
FBI STATUTORY CHARTER: HEARINGS ON S. 1612 BEFORE THE SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 95th Cong. 2d Sess., pt.1, 18-26 (1978).
351 "All investigations undertaken through these guidelines shall be designed and
conducted so as not to limit the full exercise of rights protected by the Constitution and
laws of the United States." Id. at 20.
352 FBI Oversight, 1976: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
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As a result of the growth and spread of the phenomenon of
terrorism and violence in the United States, it was decided that
these guidelines had to be changed in order to allow proper
protection to be given to the safety of the public.
On March 3, 1983, then-Attorney General William French
Smith established new guidelines with the aim of augmenting the
investigative measures available to the FBI.353 While the earlier
standards required precise facts to be established to launch an
investigation, Smith was content to require a reasonable indication
as the legal standard for the opening of a full investigation. In
order to balance this low-level standard with the concomitant
violation of human rights, Smith, like his predecessor, agreed that
no investigation would be launched solely on the basis of activities
protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution.
In a judgment delivered in 1984, the Supreme Court gave its
assent to the low threshold of "reasonable indication" for the
opening of an investigation, and held that:
The FBI need not wait till the bombs begin to go off, or even till
the bomb factory is found. .. It has a right, indeed a duty, to
keep itself informed with respect to the possible commission of
crimes: it is not obliged to wear blinders until it may be too late
for prevention. 154
Prior to the legislation of 1996 and 2001, there were those who
believed that the FBI needed further changes to be made to the
1983 guidelines, and that they should be given additional tools
within the new framework. The FBI however, was not a party to
the request for changes: "[t]he fact is that as the world becomes
increasingly complicated we need to examine our tools to
determine whether they are adequate. However, new threats need
not always prompt new procedures, and our opinion is that we do
Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 2, pt. 3, at 258
(1976).
353 THE ATTY. GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON GEN. CRIMES, RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE
AND DOM. SEC./TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS, reprinted in ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC SEC. INVESTIGATIONS, HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON
SEC. AND TERRORISM OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 47-
65 (1983).
354 Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 742 F.2d 1007, 1015 (7th Cir.
1984).
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not need new procedures now."3 '
Prior to the Patriot Act, the FBI was obliged to examine the
extent of the threat, the likelihood of it occurring, and the
imminence of the danger. The FBI was required to take into
account the danger to privacy and freedom of expression which
would be directly infringed upon by the launching of the
investigation.35 6 Only if the examination of these factors led to the
conclusion that the standard of reasonable indication had been met
could a court be asked to order a search in accordance with the
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution.
Then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated that the
purpose of the legislation of 1996 was as follows:
Our goal is to make the United States fully a no-support-for-
terrorism zone. Our message to anyone who comes into our
country intending to raise money for a terrorist organization is
you risk going to jail. And our message to anyone who is a part
of a terrorist organization and who wants to enter the United
States is you are not welcome here.357
The purpose is admirable; however, the measures enacted by
the United States are not compatible with that purpose. Did
anyone doubt that prior to 1996 the United States was a country
which opposes terrorism? Did the members of terrorist
organizations ever contemplate, prior to the legislation, that the
United States would welcome them? Of course not. The means
made available by the law did not serve the purpose; rather, they
violated human rights. The less draconian means in use prior to
the enactment of the AEDPA and the Patriot Act conformed to the
goal of fighting terrorism and infringed human rights to a much
lesser extent.
Clearly illustrating the fact that the measures provided by the
AEDPA and the Patriot Act do not conform to the goal of
suppressing terrorism is the case of Lorraine Paris, whose return to
New York from her honeymoon was delayed by reason of an
355 Howard M. Shapiro, Domestic and International Terrorism: Terrorism in a
Democratic Society, 1 J. NAT.'L SEC. L. 95, 100 (1997).
356 See FBI Statutory Charter: Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary United
States S., 95th Cong. 20-26 (1978).
357 Clark, supra note 163, at 248.
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earlier conviction from the late 1970s for possessing marijuana.358
In other words, her freedom of movement and right to enter the
United States was restricted on the basis of a conviction which had
no real connection to terrorism in respect of which the AEDPA
was enacted.
In his article, Gregory Clark explains the incompatibility
between the measures supplied by the AEDPA, as part of the U.S.
response, and the goal of eradicating terrorism:
One unfortunately typical response to terrorism focuses on
eliminating the threat by relocating or isolating it.
[D]eportation in America . . .attempt[s] to remove dangerous
factors from society. This strategy can never succeed because
moving a volatile element does not defuse its destructive power,
but merely transplants it. Exclusion of a suspect between states
or from a country entirely, arbitrarily deprives liberty, free
travel, access to family and nothing else. Further, partial action
towards individuals loosely associated with terrorist groups
often tends to tighten their binds to the organization, forcing
people underground and "increas[ing] recruitment into the
deeply clandestine armed groups, which excaerbate terrorism."
By excluding or deporting a suspected terrorist, a nation often
pushes an individual out of its bed and into the arms of her
devoted terrorist brethren. The United States would be better
advised to zealously prosecute the people with clear and
unequivocal ties to the violent activities of a terrorist enclave.359
Legislation is a central and important tool in the hands of
nations, including the United States, in the fight against terrorism.
However, "[u]nless it is carefully crafted - with an abundance of
checks and balances against the possibility of overzealous
enforcement - we may one day look back and wonder whether
the terrorists actually achieved their goal of undermining
American society.""36
As noted, contending with the phenomenon of terrorism as an
358 Antonio C. Campo, New Anti-Terrorism Law Harsh to Immigrants, FILIPINO
REP., Aug. 8, 1996, at 20.
359 Clark, supra note 163, at 273-74 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
360 Terrorism in the United States: The Nature and Extent of the Threat and
Possible Legislative Responses: Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary United
States S., 104th Cong. 127 (1995) (statement of Robert Kupperman, Senior Advisor,
Center for Strategic and International Studies).
[Vol. 28
TERRORIST ATTACKS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
unidentified, international enemy by means of legislation is
difficult but possible. The emphasis must be on exercising the
greatest possible caution when engaging in ancillary violations of
human rights. What balance is proper, and when should such an
infringement be allowed?
The proper balance should be based on the relative weight of
the right being violated - dependent on the elements underlying
the right - on one hand, and the degree of importance of the
clashing interest - to achieve which the right has violated - on
the other. National security is an important interest, and its
realization is no less important. However, the relative weight of
the violated rights is generally just as important. Accordingly, it is
necessary to shape the balancing test in a manner similar to the
fundamental balancing test applied in Israel - the limitation
clause.361 Under this test, every measure supplied by U.S. law to
security authorities that violates human rights must meet three
conditions.3 62 The test must accord with the democratic values of
the United States, it must be for a proper purpose, and it must
satisfy the test of proportionality.3 63 There must be a rational
connection between the measure adopted and the purpose. It must
be the least drastic measure in the sense that there be no other
measure which can achieve the objective and infringe the right to a
lesser extent, and the benefit derived from infringing the right
must exceed the damage ensuing from the violation.
It should be pointed out that this balancing test is not foreign to
American case law. As previously discussed, prior to the
enactment of the anti-terrorist legislation, it was not possible to
infringe the right of freedom of expression, save for a proper
purpose which was foreign to the political interests of the
government and on condition that the limitation on the right was
proportional. In other words, the legislation could not exceed
what was necessary.364
The most important component of this test is the requirement
that all elements of the test of proportionality be met. Satisfying
this requirement will prevent an unnecessary violation of human
361 ISR. CONST. (Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom 1992), § 8.
362 See id.
363 See id
364 See supra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
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rights on the assumption that the courts will insist on exposing the
real purpose motivating the enforcement and security agencies of
the United States to use the measures that the Patriot Act allows
them. If the purpose is indeed protecting national security, the
court must require concrete intelligence information that there is a
danger to national security. If such information exists, then there is
a rational connection between the measure adopted and national
security. However, the danger inherent in conferring on the
enforcement agencies powers which violate human rights lies in
the fact that these measures may be used for racist and
discriminatory reasons (as the broadest powers are directed
towards aliens). In such cases, there is no rational connection
between the measures adopted and the purpose; therefore, the
importance of exposing the concealed motive underlying the
authorities' activities increases. In cases where it is not possible to
turn to the courts, and the Attorney General is authorized to permit
a measure, the responsibility for scrutinizing the rational
connection between the measure and its purpose must be imposed
on the Attorney General, as must all the other elements of the
fundamental balancing test.
After a rational connection has been found between the
measure and the purpose, it is necessary to examine - prior to
exercising the power - whether it is possible to achieve the
purpose by means which are less drastic than the means afforded
by the Patriot Act. For example, instead of arriving without notice
at the home of a person and searching his property, is it possible to
notify the person prior to conducting the search and still achieve
the desired objective?
Finally, it is necessary to consider whether the benefit ensuing
from the violation of the right exceeds the damage caused by it.
This third element of the test of proportionality will always exist if
the first two elements are present; it will supplement the test and
close the circle, which may not be at the forefront of the
considerations of the authorizing person.
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VI. The External Aspect: Fighting Terrorism By Armed
Means
A. Is the United States action against Afghanistan an act of
self-defense or a punitive measure?
The internal dimension of the United States's response - the
new legislation having the declared purpose of providing the
security and investigative authorities with measures to fight
terrorism - was not the sole response to the attack launched on
September 11, 2001. An external response impacting the entire
world found expression in U.S. President George Bush's
declaration of "War Against Terrorism."
Wars are prohibited according to rules of international law. An
armed attack is only possible within the framework of self-
defense. In this part, this article shall examine whether the
American response, which took the form of a stubborn and wide
ranging armed attack on Afghanistan, conforms with the rules of
international law and whether the action is indeed one of self-
defense; or whether, on the contrary, the act was intended purely
to punish the perpetrators of the terrorist attack - Osama Bin
Laden and his followers.
Following the appalling attack against New York and
Washington, the President of the United States spoke to the nation
and explained:
On September the 1 th, enemies of freedom committed an act of
war against our country. Americans have known wars - but for
the past 136 years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except
for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the causalities
of war - but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful
morning. Americans have known surprise attacks - but never
before on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us
in a single day-and night fell on a different world, a world
where freedom itself is under attack. . . . Our war on terror
begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end
until every terrorist group of global reach has been found,
stopped and defeated. . . . This is not however, just America's
fight. And what is at stake is not just America's freedom. This is
the world's fight. This is civilization's fight. This is the fight of
all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and
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freedom. 3
65
It is difficult to ignore the strong sense of anger, rage, and the
desire for revenge emerging from the words of President Bush.
From a moral point of view, the contents of this speech can be
identified, yet from the point of view of the legal and statutory
rules enabling the initiation of an armed attack, there is not that
level of certainty as to the justification for such a war. It should be
recalled that this war is not an ordinary one. It is a war which has
an enemy, but an enemy without an address. A war against terror
lacks the traditional character of a war where it is possible to
identify the parties on the basis of clear geographical factors. The
training camps of Bin Laden in Afghanistan are not the only
enemy. The terrorist organizations have established cells in almost
every country. The United Nations Charter is the fundamental
source for the prohibition against war. Article 2(3) of the United
Nations Charter provides that "[a]ll [m]embers shall settle their
international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that
international peace and security, and justice, are not
endangered. 366
In effect, the United Nations Charter entrenches and adds to
the basic principles which developed as a matter of customary
international law following the Hague Peace Conferences. 367 The
United Nations Charter prohibits the use of war for the entire
international community. Thus, Article 2(4) prohibits the use of
force against "any state" not only against a Member State.368
The United Nations Charter creates a legal structure
prohibiting the use or threat of force with a central exception that
enables the use of force for the purpose of self-defense under
Article 51 of the Charter.3 69 This Article uses the language of the
365 President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the
American People (Sep. 20, 2001), available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases
/2001/09/20010920-8.html. President Bush's speech before Congress on September 20,
2001 declared that America had found its mission: "freedom and fear are at war." Id. (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
366 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3.
367 See Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, July 29,
1899, 32 Stat. 1779, 187 Consol. T.S. 410, as amended, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2199,
205 Consol. T.S. 233.
368 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
369 U.N. CHARTER art. 51. Article 51 provides:
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right to self-defense against armed attack, whereas customary
international law is concerned with self-defense against acts of
aggression. The term "armed attack" is narrower than the term
"aggression," and accordingly, this article shall first examine
whether the attack of September 11, 2001 was an armed attack
against the United States that conferred upon the United States the
right to self-defense.
The term "armed attack" is not defined in the Charter, and it
has been the subject of two interpretive approaches in. legal
literature. The narrow approach holds that the right to self-defense
only arises after the occurrence of an armed attack or, at the least,
where there is a high and real likelihood of such an occurrence. An
armed attack is a form of aggression; however, while threats and
declarations alone are sufficient to establish aggression, they are
insufficient to comprise an armed attack. The attack must be
carried out with weapons. It must consist of the use of actual
physical force against a State for that the State to have the right to
engage in self-defense. Accordingly, pre-emptive war is not
permitted under Article 51, even though it is permitted by
customary international law.37 ° Under this approach, the right to
self-defense should not be exercised in order to punish an
attacking State in the absence of a continuing threat.371
Do terrorist activities amount to an "armed attack"? The
judgment of the International Court of Justice in the case of
Nicaragua v. United States of America stated, in effect, that
terrorist acts do not amount to an "armed attack." '372 Despite the
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the
exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility
of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action
as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and
security.
Id.
370 YORAM DINsTEIN, THE LAWS OF WAR 65-72 (Tel Aviv University Press 1983)
(author's translation).
371 Gregory M. Travalio, Terrorism, International Law, and the Use of Military
Force, 18 WIS. INT'L L. J. 145, 162 (2000).
372 Id. at 158.
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U.N. Security Council consistently adhering in most of its
decisions to the narrow approach by condemning actions taken in
self-defense by the State "under attack," '373 the Security Council
took a different course in its decision following the terrorist attack
on the United States on September 11, 2001.4 It identified a right
to self-defense in connection with an act of terror."'
The broad approach explains that in the light of the special
language used by the Charter - "nothing ...shall impair the
inherent right of... self-defense." 376 The intention is to preserve
the right to self-defense as acknowledged in customary
international law. 377 The interpretation given to "inherent right" is
the use of force for the purpose of self-defense in accordance with
the requirements established by the Caroline Doctrine which
provided the basis for the interpretation of the term "aggression"
in customary. international law.378 Forming that doctrine, then-
U.S. Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, presented the
circumstances required for an action to be justified as self-defense:
"show a necessity of self-defence [sic], instant, overwhelming,
373 See, e.g., SCOR Res. 573, U.N. SCOR, 40th Sess., 2615th mtg. at 23, U.N. Doc.
S/PV.2615 (1985). This resolution rejected Israel's claim that it had acted in self-defense
in relation to an operation carried out in 1985 against the headquarters of the PLO near
Tunis. Id. The resolution condemned the act of aggression perpetrated by the State of
Israel. Id.
374 SCOR Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368
(2001).
375 See Said Mahmoudi, Comment on Fox Addendum, at http://www.asil.org
/insights/insigh77.htm#comment3 (Sep. 21, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation). Professor Mahmoudi stated:
The Security Council is now obviously faced with a situation that profoundly
differs from the situation in 1985 when Palestinian groups carried out individual
attacks on Israeli targets, normally with limited casualties. That is why the
members of the Security Council, in their resolution 1368 (2001), in
contradistinction to Resolution 573 (1985), unanimously recognize the right of
each State to individual and collective self-defense in situations like the present
one in the U.S.
Id.
376 U.N. CHARTER, art. 51
377 James P. Terry, Countering State-Sponsored Terrorism: A Law-Policy Analysis,
36 NAVAL L. REV. 159, 170 (1986).
378 Robert F. Teplitz, Taking Assassination Attempts Seriously: Did the United
States Violate International Law in Forcefully Responding to the Iraqi Plot to Kill
George Bush?, 28 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 569, 578 (1995).
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leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation." '379
There is no doubt that adopting the narrow interpretation of the
right to self-defense would give terrorists an enormous advantage
in their war against democracy.380 Threats and declarations of
future aggression are insufficient to establish an armed attack
under the narrow interpretation, but are sufficient to give rise to a
right to self-defense as a matter of customary international law.381
Most scholars agree that the term "armed attack" entails a
serious attack, which is not one-time, against the territory of a
State or its citizens as such. Such an attack would only justify the
use of force on grounds of self-defense if all attempts at peaceful
resolution have been exhausted.382 This approach may also be seen
in the interpretation given by the United States to the term "self-
defense." The United States has raised three possibilities of self-
defense: (1) self-defense in the face of the real use of force or
hostile actions; (2) self-defense as a preventive action in the face
of immediate activities where it is anticipated that force will be
used; and (3) self-defense in the face of a persistent threat.383
Such an interpretation reflects a balance between the broad and
narrow interpretations. The first alternative concerns the situation
of an actual attack which falls within the narrow definition given
to armed attacks. The second situation expands the definition to
situations where the attacks have not yet actually taken place but
in which there is an expectation that they will occur. The third
situation is compatible with the broader interpretation, whereby
379 Id. at 577. It is necessary that the threat be existential, or at the least real and
tangible. Necessity - the response is needed in order to defend against the threat. The
response must be proportional to the threat, restricted by the need for self-defense and
clearly left within its framework. The response may not be unreasonable. The response
of self-defense is the last and not the first option. First, all other means that do not
require the use of force must be exhausted. At the least, it must be shown that an effort
was made to resolve the dispute in such a manner. See id.
380 Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 MrL. L.
REv. 89, 93 (1989).
381 Yoram Dinstein, THE LAWS OF WAR 68-69 (Tel Aviv University Press, 1983)
(author's translation).
382 Robert J. Beck & Anthony C. Arend, Don't Tread on Us: International Law and
Forcible State Responses to Terrorism, 12 WIS. INT'L L. J. 153, 201 (1994).
383 Jami Melissa Jackson, The Legality of Assassination of Independent Terrorist
Leaders: An Examination of National and International Implications, 24 N.C. J. INT'L
L. & COM. REG. 669, 683 (1999).
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the armed attack also embraces situations where the attack has not
yet occurred, but where there is a persistent and continuing (as
opposed to one-time) threat of the occurrence of an armed attack.
It is clear that the terrorist attack against the United States was an
armed attack. Yet, self-defense is not and cannot be a punitive
action.
Killing a person as part of a retaliatory or punitive action is
unlawful, whereas killing him as part of a pre-emptive action of
self-defense is lawful, albeit subject to a number of restrictions.384
Was the United States's action in Afghanistan pre-emptive and
protected under the canopy of self-defense, or was it a retaliatory
action?
In answering this question, caution must be exercised to not
confuse the moral justification for exercising the right to self-
defense and the legal justification for exercising that right. It is
difficult to question the moral justification for exercising the right
to self-defense against terrorist organizations. In the same way as
it is inconceivable to ask a man not to defend himself against a
danger to his life, it is also inconceivable to prevent a State from
implementing that right. Indeed, it is the State's duty to defend
itself and its citizens against anticipated attacks, even if these are
launched by bodies which are not States.385 When the lives of
citizens are threatened by terrorist attacks and no alternative to
force is available which will effectively eradicate terrorism, there
is moral justification, under the theory of self-defense, to permit
the State to defend itself against the terrorist organizations. For
example, Professor Schachter believes that injury to civilians in a
foreign State comprises an armed attack within the meaning of
Article 51 of the Charter and gives rise to the right of self-
defense.386
Additionally, Professor Coll contends that it would be a
mistake to interpret Article 51 as absolutely prohibiting a military
reaction to terror. Coll states, "[s]elf-defense consists essentially
384 Louis Rend Beres, On Assassination as Anticipatory Self-Defense: The Case of
Israel, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 321, 329 (1991).
385 Assa Casher, MILITARY ETHICS 37-38 (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense Press
1996) (author's translation).
386 Oscar Schachter, The Extra-Territorial Use of Force Against Terrorist Bases, 11
Hous. J. INT'L L. 309, 312 (1989).
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of measures necessary to protect the State and its people from
outside armed attack in all its conventional and non-conventional
forms, including terrorism. 3
87
From this it follows that terrorist attacks against innocent
civilians justify an act of self-defense. The decision of the U.N.
Security Council on September 13, 2001, two days after the
attacks, identifies the right of every State to self-defense against
such acts of terror.388 It would seem that the Security Council
acknowledges the need to equate acts of terror (at least those acts
that cause massive loss of life) with an armed attack within the
meaning of Article 51 of the Charter.
As noted, moral reasons cannot justify exercising the right to
self-defense against terrorist organizations. Instead, the right of
self-defense must conform to the rules of international law.
Accordingly, the idea of making use of armed forces to attack
terrorist organizations located in foreign countries must be made
compatible with Article 2(4) of the Charter.389 Member States
must refrain from threatening or making use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any State or act in
any other way which is incompatible with. the purposes of the
United Nations.
First, the State which plans to make use of force must ensure
that the objectives being targeted for. attack pose a terrorist threat.
This threat must be one that it is assumed will occur and that the
State in which the terrorists are located is not able or willing to
cope with it. The level of proof needed is 'not beyond any
reasonable doubt, but clear and convincing evidence must be
presented, as it is possible that innocent people will be killed, and
therefore, it would not be moral to take such a large risk without
387 Alberto Coil, The Legal and Moral Adequacy of Military Responses to
Terrorism, 81 AM. SoC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 297, 307 (1987).
388 S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 4370th mtg', U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001):
The Security Council . . . Recognizing the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense in accordance with the Charter . . . Unequivocally
condemns in the strongest terms the horrifying terrorist attacks which took place
on I 1 September 2001 in New York, Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania and
regards such acts, like any act of international terrorism, as a threat to
international peace and security.
Id.
389 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
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being certain that the planned target is appropriate and that the
threat is real and serious.39 ° In the Nicaragua case, mentioned
above, the court pointed to the minimum conditions required in
order to enable a military response against a terrorist attack,
including the requirements of evidence.39' The court mandated
"that the nation carefully evaluate the evidence to ensure a high
degree of certainty that it has identified those responsible for an
attack and that more attacks are imminent .... ,,392
Secondly, the use of power must be limited to one purpose
only - the need to remove the terrorist threat. So long as the State
does not support the organization, no action should be taken
against its facilities and military camps. Third, the use of force
must be proportional to the size of the threat; the use of force must
be restrained. Fourth, the threat need not be imminent in
accordance with the requirement in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter,
but it must be likely that the threat will indeed be realized.393
Fifth, force may not be used unless all non-violent means have
been exhausted, or it is clear that the threat is about to be realized
prior to the conclusion of efforts to resolve the dispute by peaceful
means.3 94 The latter requirement - to exhaust peaceful measures
- is the most important and problematic of the requirements
where the enemy is a terrorist organization.
Self-defense is an exception to the theory whereby disputes are
resolved by the normative structures of the rule of law: within the
State - by the authorities responsible for the enforcement of the
law between States; on the international level - in accordance
with the Charter. The latter offers a mechanism to resolve disputes
peacefully with the help of the Security Council of the U.N. -
unless there is an imminent existential threat which requires
immediate defensive action. Even in such a case, notification of
the action must be given to the Security Council and it will
390 Emanuel Gross, Human Rights in Administrative Proceedings: A Quest for an
Appropriate Evidentiary Standard, 31 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 215 (2001).
391 Jules Lobel, Colloquy: The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist Attacks: The
Bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 537, 547 (1999).
392 Id.
393 Michael N. Schmitt, State-Sponsored Assassination in International and
Domestic Law, YALE J. INT'L L. 609, 648-49 (1992).
394 Gregory M. Travalio, Terrorism, International Law and the Use of Military
Force, 18 Wis. INT'L L. J. 145, 171-73 (2000).
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examine if it is indeed indispensable. The requirement that
disputes which provide grounds for war first be resolved by means
of negotiations is compatible with the Charter and international
law. The State of Israel, for example, acted in this way with the
Palestinian Authority prior to engaging in military actions required
to defend its citizens.395
The United States took the same course following the attack on
September 11, 2001. The President of the United States demanded
that the Taliban government close terrorist training camps and
extradite terrorist leaders to the United States. Only after a wait of
more than two weeks in which these demands were not met did
President Bush declare: "Now the Taliban will pay a price. 396
In his speech to the nation about the military response against
Afghanistan, the President emphasized that the targets were
military targets of the Taliban government and the terrorist
organizations being sheltered by it. The action would be taken
solely for the purpose of removing the threat. The United States
was interested in harming the terrorists, not the Afghan
population:
We're a peaceful nation. Yet, as we have learned, so suddenly
and so tragically, there can be no Peace in a world of sudden
terror. In the face of today's new threat, the only way to pursue
peace is to pursue those who threaten it. .. . By destroying
camps and disrupting communications, we will make it more
difficult for the terror network to train new recruits and
coordinate their evil plans. . . . Our military action is also
designed to clear the way for sustained, comprehensive and
relentless operations to drive them out and bring them to Justice.
At the same time, the oppressed people of Afghanistan will
know the generosity of America and our allies. As we strike
military targets, we will also drop food, medicine and supplies to
the starving and suffering men and women and children of
Afghanistan .... We're a peaceful nation. Yet as we have
395 Emanuel Gross, Thwarting Terrorist Acts by Attacking the Perpetrators or their
Commanders as an Act of Self-defense. Is this Legitimate? - Human Rights Versus the
State's Duty to Protect its Citizens, 15 TEMP. INT'L & CoMP. L. J. (forthcoming)
(manuscript on file with Temple International and Comparative Law Journal).
396 Bush Speaks to the Nation, S.F. CHRoN., Oct. 7, 2001, at http://sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file=/gate/archive/2001/10/07/bushtranscript.DTL (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
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learned so suddenly and so tragically, there can be no peace in a
world of sudden terror. In the face of today's new threat, the
only way to pursue peace is to pursue those who threaten it.
397
Does the United States meet the remaining conditions which
justify its acts actions as self-defense? Even if we assume that the
United States had clear and convincing evidence that terrorists
were located within the territory of Afghanistan and that the State
was unable to deal with them, did the United States have clear and
convincing evidence that these terrorists posed a real threat so that
there was a real likelihood that the threat would be realized in the
shape of additional terrorist attacks?
The use of force in this war was not confined to eliminating
the terrorist threat, even if this was the original intention. On many
occasions, we heard reports of serious harm to innocent civilians
in population centers, a result which leads to the conclusion that
the exercise of force was not sufficiently restrained as required by
the rules of international law.3 98
The attack against Afghanistan was justified in several
respects. Indeed, the end result shows that many terrorists, Bin
Laden's agents, were indeed located inside the territorial borders
of Afghanistan. It is also not certain that the United States could
have refrained from injuring civilians (however, did it do
everything possible not to injure those civilians?) since one of the
known characteristics of a terrorist organization is that it finds
shelter in population centers in order. to exploit the fact that the
State is subject to the rules of war -which prohibit injury to
civilians.
397 Id.
398 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1),
adopted on June 8, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1391 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1979) [hereinafter
Protocol 1]. Article 48 of the Protocol 1 requires that a distinction be made between
combatants and civilians, and between military targets and civilian targets. Id. Article 57
of Protocol 1 provides that these persons must (i) do everything feasible to verify that the
objectives to be attacked are military objectives and that it is not prohibited by the
provisions of this Protocol to attack them; (ii) take all feasible precautions with a view to
avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, damage to civilian objects; (iii) refrain from
indiscriminate attacks. Id. An attack must be cancelled or suspended if it becomes
apparent that the objective is not a military one. Id. Effective advance warning must be
given of attacks that may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances exist that
make advance warning not possible. Id.
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The problem identified here is that of the lawfulness of the
action in terms of the laws of war. It is not certain that the United
States response is compatible with the requirements, even the most
moderate, allowing the exercise of the right to self-defense. If the
United States had information that the extradition of Bin Laden
and his followers would prevent additional attacks, and without his
extradition he would continue to control the terrorist network and
'damage the United States in the future, refusal to extradite him
would have justified the exercise of the right to self-defense with
the use of force. However, if the United States did not possess
such information, and Bin Laden's extradition was demanded only
in order to punish him and not out of a fear of future attacks, then
by going to war against Afghanistan, the United States established
a new category justifying the exercise of the right to self-defense,
a category whereby an armed attack is a possible response to the
failure to extradite a wanted terrorist.
Drawing a comparison with Israel in this regard, circumstances
have shown that the failure to extradite wanted persons has led to
continued suicide attacks within the territory of Israel, serious
injury to innocent civilians as well as the assassination of a
political figure, Minister Rehavam Ze'evi. Israel's demand that
the wanted terrorists be extradited had a dual objective. The first
was to place the terrorists on trial. The second was to thereby
prevent additional terrorist attacks. This dual objective is what
justifies the targeted elimination policy adopted by Israel against
the terrorists within the Palestinian Authority.
Does the United States seek to achieve the same dual objective
in its war against Afghanistan? Does the demand to extradite Bin
Laden follow from the dual need to bring him to justice and
thereby prevent additional terrorist attacks? Perhaps in the history
books to be written in many years time, when it will be possible to
reveal all the information, we shall know the answer to this
question.
Conclusion
In 1987, Justice William Brennan of the U.S. Supreme Court
gave a lecture in Jerusalem on human rights in times of security
crises in the United States. 99 In his view, the history of the United
399 William Brennan, The Quest To Develop A Jurisprudehce of Civil Liberties In
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States has shown that human rights have been repeatedly infringed
upon in times of emergency, not by reason of calculated actions,
but as a result of panic and paranoia. Each time, after the crisis had
passed, it became clear that there had been no justification for
violating civil rights. In his opinion, the history of the United
States in this connection "teaches that the predicted threat to
national security, which leads to the victimization of human rights
in times of crises, is often exaggerated and unfounded
factually."4 °°
This article which examined the basic situation of human
rights in the United States and the sharp shift in the scope of the
protection given to.these rights following the 1996 enactment of
the AEDPA, and the further erosion which took place in 2001 with
the enactment of the Patriot Act, provides further support for the
comments of Justice Brennan. The two acts lead to further
infringements of human rights as a result of a paranoid fear of
terrorism.
In contrast, it has been demonstrated that Israel, which is
subject to persistent terrorist threats to its security, has not let
paranoia result in security interests being given real preference
over human rights. Possibly, in the past, it could have been argued
that a comparison between the United States and Britain on one
hand and Israel on the other was unfair, "precisely because the
security threat to Israel is a permanent threat means that Israel
must be cautious in relation to human rights more than other
nations. 401
However, today, the development of international terrorism
has placed the world under a permanent threat. The powers
conferred by the Patriot Act are not limited to special times of
emergency. The Act is active and prospective in the sense that it
has immediate and future effect in the light of the reaction to
terrorism as a permanent threat, and not as a temporary or passing
threat which requires the use of powers which are limited in time
and which are confined to emergencies.
Times Of Security Crises, Sh. Shetreet (ed.), NATIONAL SECURITY AND FREE SPEECH
(Kluwer, 1989) (author's translation).
400 Id.
401 1. Zamir, Human Rights and National Security, 19 MISHPATIM 17, 23 (1989)
(author's translation).
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We have pointed to the fact that paranoia has struck the United
States in an internal legislative aspect and an external aspect, in its
war in Afghanistan. There the United States launched itself with
the greatest possible speed into an armed struggle against the
terrorists in Afghanistan. The United States declared its motive to
be self-defense, but it is not at all certain that the real purpose was
not punitive. In the future, we may ,come to the conclusion that
"the United States is concerned with military showmanship which
has only increased the cycle of hatred"4"2 and is far from bringing
about the real and absolute eradication of even one terrorist
movement.
I can only hope that the comments made by the Deputy
President of the Supreme Court of Israel, Haim Cohn will fall on
attentive ears:
What distinguishes the State's fight from the fight of its
enemies: the former fights and complies with the law, and the
latter fights and breaches the law. The moral strength and the
material justification for the authorities' fight are completely
dependent on preserving the laws of the State: by waiving this
strength and this justification for its war, the authorities serve
the objectives of the enemy. The moral weapon is not less
important than any other weapon and perhaps supercedes it -
and there is no more efficient weapon than the rule of law. All
those who need to know - should know thatthe rule of law in
Israel will never yield to its enemies.40 3
402 Yossi Deskel, Way of the Mind, not the Might, HA'ARETZ, July 11, 2001, at 2B
(author's translation).
403 H.C. 320/80 Kawasma v. Minister of Defense, 35(3) P.D. 113, 132 (author's
translation).
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